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Preface: 100 Years of Heidegger 
Today, scholars and students alike are now enjoying the novel privilege of having access 
to the final volumes published of the Gesamstausgabe, with all but a few available in English – 
to say nothing of the many other languages into which the original German was translated. 
However, alongside this, we must also acknowledge another feature of Heidegger’s works 
present in our time. For, indeed, the first text used thematically in this project, Grundprobleme 
der Phänomenologie (GA 58), consists of a lecture presented by Heidegger precisely one 
hundred years ago. Thus, we are called to reflect on the impact of this thinker and the weight of 
his contributions that inform our understanding about philosophy and human being as they begin 
to reach their centenary status.  
It is therefore essential to then acknowledge the vast amount of academic work that has 
amassed over the last century, as it provides invaluable insight into Heidegger’s thought at every 
level of understanding. It is from these resources that a work such as this is made possible. Thus, 
it is my hope that as each coming year celebrates the centennial presentation or publication of 
Heidegger’s works, the thought and discourse fostered by this remarkable thinker, in fulfillment 
of his ever-imparted call for another new beginning of philosophy, will continue on for another 
hundred years in study and research. I offer this work in such celebration. 
In a final word, as I am in tremendous debt to these scholars who have presented their 
work, and in doing so made this project possible, I owe this immediately to all of my professors 
and to the members of my committee. It is to you all that I hold the most profound gratitude for 
your care throughout my many years of study, and I further offer this work as a small token of 
my appreciation in admiration and friendship. 
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Abstract 
In this work, I show Martin Heidegger’s development of the phenomenological method 
from 1919 to 1929 as his main approach to all philosophical inquiry. In Chapter 1: 
Phenomenology as the Hermeneutics of Factical Life, I first show how Heidegger begins his 
philosophical career in 1919 with lectures that describe phenomenology as an ‘original science’ 
that seeks to study the structural character of life in itself. Through the four sub-sections of 
Chapter 1, I show how Heidegger continues to formulate distinct stages of phenomenological 
methodology through these early lectures that aid in his task to continue the explication of life 
through the specific character of facticity. In this manner, the phenomenological method appears 
in these early lectures of the 1920’s to progress from the original science of life in itself to what 
Heidegger calls the hermeneutics of facticity – a critical method of interpretation aimed at 
exposing the structures of facticity as the being of life and the being of human Dasein. Here, I 
likewise show how Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology changes through these 
lectures, providing radically new shifts and insights to his approach to philosophy that uncover 
the ontological task of phenomenology.  
Following these lectures, I then show in what sense Heidegger’s understanding of 
phenomenology becomes properly thematized in its ontological import in Chapter 2: 
Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology. Here, I begin with the 1927 publication of 
Heidegger’s masterwork Sein und Zeit where the question of the meaning of being and the being 
of Dasein become critical matters of phenomenological investigation. It is here that I show in 
what sense Sein und Zeit marks a new stage in Heidegger’s phenomenological thinking as 
developed through his previous lectures. In this manner, through the four sub-sections of Chapter 
2, I likewise show how Heidegger proceeds from the analysis of the being of Dasein to the 
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problematization of a purely ontological thinking of being itself through various lectures 
following Sein und Zeit. Here, through a radicalization of metaphysics as the study ‘beyond 
beings,’ Heidegger provides a new understanding of phenomenology as the path to the thinking 
of being in its pure possibility.  
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Introduction 
 The works of German philosopher Martin Heidegger have long been regarded as critical 
contributions to the history of philosophy. However, upon first encountering Heidegger, one may 
be in search of insights into being and the nature of human existence, and thus seek an 
understanding of ‘his philosophy’ as a traditional collection of ideas, or in an even more 
dangerous capacity, as answers. However, as I will show in this work, and in a manner I contend 
to be in support of Heidegger’s own intentions, what remains at stake is not to approach 
Heidegger in this regard as just any thinker who seems to proffer wisdom. Rather, Heidegger’s 
work is consistently in service of a formulation of ‘how’ to think – the development of an 
approach to all philosophy – that is, the rigorous and powerful method of phenomenology.  
Indeed, as his philosophical career began giving lectures on phenomenology under its 
founder, Edmund Husserl, Heidegger appears to immediately task himself with understanding 
the method and aim of phenomenology as his approach to encountering all philosophical matters. 
Thus, from his first lecture concerning the basic problems of phenomenology in 1919 until his 
inaugural lecture address upon gaining the retired Husserl’s professorship in 1929, each lecture 
and publication provides a new, radical revision of the method of phenomenology expressed 
through remarkable demonstrations that grasp philosophical matters with a new understanding – 
matters ranging from life experience, to history, to human existence, and indeed to nothing at all. 
To provide an understanding of the essential relation to phenomenology that exists in 
Heidegger’s thought, I will here present my research tracking Heidegger’s understanding and 
development of the phenomenological method through its various manifestations as it appears 
from 1919 to 1929. Through this, the role of phenomenology to Heidegger’s thought shall be 
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made precisely clear, as it provides the possibility for the thought behind his most famous works 
on the meaning of being and of human existence through Dasein. To accomplish this, I will 
present my research in two chapters, each with four sub-sections. My presentation will proceed 
in the following manner:  
In Chapter 1: Phenomenology as the Hermeneutics of Factical Life, I will present 
Heidegger’s initial understanding of phenomenology as the ‘original science of factical life’ and 
its development through his early lectures on its way to a method of ontological analysis. Here, I 
will show how Heidegger’s early lectures provide a critical stage of progression for 
phenomenology as he attends to four essential stages of method: description, destruction, 
reduction, and interpretation or hermeneutics. To express these matters, I will present 
Heidegger’s formulation of the phenomenological method in the following four sub-sections.   
In “Description and ‘Taking-Notice,’” I will discuss phenomenological description as it 
appears in the 1919/20 Winter semester lecture, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58). 
Here, I will show that phenomenological description is understood as a ‘taking-notice’ of life 
experience to explicate the phenomenon of life in itself – a transition from individual first-person 
life experience to the character of life as such as it presents itself through experience. In 
“Destruction and Formal Indication,” I will discuss phenomenological destruction and formal 
indication as it appears in the 1920 Summer semester lecture Phänomenologie der Anschauung 
und des Ausdrucks (GA 59) and the 1920/21 Winter, 1921 Summer semester lectures in 
Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). Here, I will show that phenomenological 
destruction is first understood as the address of historical tradition that enables philosophy to 
start afresh and begin its original work unclouded by the answers already provided by the history 
of philosophy. Following this, I will show that phenomenological destruction is secondly 
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understood as a four-step process whereby a concept is isolated and its original meaning, given 
only partially at first, is then brought-out so that it can be understood in a new light. For this, I 
will show to what end formal indication appears as a pre-stage of phenomenological destruction 
as a mode of understanding a phenomenon provisionally by its relational aspects in experience.  
In “Hermeneutics,” I will discuss hermeneutic interpretation as it appears in the 1921/22 
Winter semester lecture Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die 
Phänomenologische Forschung (GA 61) and the 1922 Summer semester lecture Ontologie – 
Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63). Here, I will show that hermeneutics is a type of 
phenomenological interpretation that seeks to investigate the meaning of phenomena as it 
presents itself in some encounter, and from which its being can be exposed and understood. 
Further, I will show how this provides Heidegger with a prime access to the being of human 
being through Dasein, cementing phenomenology as a method of ontology. Lastly, in 
“Phenomenology as Such,” I will discuss the appearance of phenomenology in the 1923/24 
Winter semester lecture Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17) and the 1925 
Summer semester lecture Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). Here, I will 
show Heidegger’s new understanding of phenomenology as expressed through the Ancient 
Greek concepts of ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ, signifying a specific mode of encountering entities 
that clears a path through which their being can be revealed. Further, I will express how this new 
understanding of phenomenology provides Heidegger with a path of access to ontology. 
In Chapter 2: Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology, I will show how Heidegger 
arrives at a thinking of ontology through phenomenology, and further, as phenomenology 
provides him with a greater understanding of ontology through a rethinking of metaphysics. 
Here, I will show how phenomenology appears in Heidegger’s famous 1927 publication Sein und 
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Zeit (GA 2) as the method of investigation and interpretation from which the meaning of being 
can be accessed through an analysis of the being of Dasein. Following this text, I will then show 
how Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as the method of ontology progresses to open 
a path to the thinking of being in its pure possibility, or ‘beyond beings’ as expressed by 
metaphysics. To accomplish this, I will present Heidegger’s formulation of the 
phenomenological method of ontology in four sub-sections. 
In “Investigation and Interpretation,” I will discuss phenomenological investigation and 
interpretation as it appears in the 1927 publication Sein und Zeit (GA 2). Here, I will show that 
phenomenological investigation and interpretation is the way in which an entity is disclosed in 
some manner of appearance and thus revealed in some manner of being. Further, as it relates to 
Dasein, the entity in question for an access to being itself, I will show in what sense Dasein is the 
subject of phenomenological investigation and interpretation as Heidegger conducts an analysis 
of its everyday mode of appearance, being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein] and subsequently 
interpreted with regards to the primordial phenomena of care [Sorge] and time [Zeit] which allow 
its being to become manifest. In “Reduction, Construction, Destruction,” I will discuss 
phenomenological reduction, construction, and destruction as it appears in the 1927 Summer 
semester lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). Here, I will show in what 
sense these constitute Heidegger’s new methodological formulation of phenomenology as the 
path to ontology. I will further show specifically in what sense each stage of the method – 
reduction, construction, and destruction, respectively – operate in leading away from the 
appearance of an individual being and towards being itself.  
In “Interpretations of Kant,” I will discuss Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation 
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as it appears in the 1927/28 Winter semester lecture 
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Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25). Here, I will 
provide Heidegger’s understanding of the aims of phenomenological interpretation, similar to its 
manifestation in GA 2. Alongside this, I will present Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique, 
through which he arrives at a new understanding of phenomenology and its task of the thinking 
of being in its pure possibility through metaphysics. Lastly, in “Metaphysics,” I will discuss 
Heidegger’s further development of the phenomenological method towards metaphysics as it 
appears in the 1929 Spring inaugural lecture Was ist Metaphysik? (GA 9). Here, I will present 
Heidegger’s understanding of the essential role of the nothing [das Nichts] with respect to the 
possibility of any ontological thinking. From this, I will show to what extent the nothing informs 
Heidegger’s new understanding of metaphysics through the phenomenality of the nothing in its 
self-unfolding character. 
Prior to the presentation of this research, it is worth putting forth a word on the scope of 
this work. It is apparent both from the objectives of the work and from the depth of the subject 
matter that this project could no doubt appear in a work of doubled length or more on the texts 
included herein alone. For, overall, the aim of this project – to show Heidegger’s development of 
the phenomenological method and its essential role in his approach to philosophy – is one which 
can and indeed needs be further applied to the rest of the materials within the Gesamstausgabe, 
as it is clearly present throughout his career up to the very end.1  To complete this fully is 
nothing short of an impossible task that one can only hope to achieve in part throughout careful 
attention and rigorous work in the course of a single lifetime. For it indeed concerns the entire 
life’s work of one man and indeed, as I contend, his work on a single mode of thinking.  
 
1 See Martin Heidegger, “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie,” in Zur Sache des Denkens, (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer, 1969), 91-102, “My Way to Phenomenology,” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1972), 74-82, hereafter referenced as GA 14. 
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The intense absorption and investment that was required to effectively read these texts 
has foremost been the greatest challenge and indeed the greatest reward of this project, as 
through both my own enchantment and Heidegger’s unique modes of presentation I have battled 
constantly to remain in control of the subject matter. Yet, what has appeared as a result of this 
engagement I feel is both accurate and honorific of the original content, presented with the 
deepest respect and admiration. Thus, it has been my most honest attempt to provide the essential 
material to illustrate the progression of Heidegger’s thinking as it moves through 
phenomenology, and the dynamism of the phenomenological method itself, beginning with the 
early lectures of his career and continuing on to breach his most famous published work Sein und 
Zeit and beyond. To this end, I have at every chance indicated as many possible references for 
further discussion and provided sufficient explanations when necessary within my footnotes, 
cited in German/English pagination. For indeed, it appears as Heidegger’s foremost task to 
present the possibilities of a special way of thinking – to understand the phenomenological 
method as a mode of encountering, as opposed to systems of “levers and switchgears…,”2 and to 
invite the occasion of this unique encounter of thought to become more persistent.   
 
 
 
 
 
2 Martin Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993), 22, 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Scott Campbell, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 16, hereafter referenced 
as GA 58. 
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Chapter 1: Phenomenology as The Hermeneutics of Factical Life 
My task in this chapter is to illustrate Heidegger’s beginnings as a phenomenological 
thinker, guided by his first formulations of phenomenology as a method to philosophy. By 
examining key texts from early in Heidegger’s career, it will be made clear in what manner 
phenomenology as a method provides Heidegger with an access to the subject matter of 
philosophy, which Heidegger first delineates as ‘the original science of factical life in itself 
[Ursprungswissenschaft vom Leben an sich].’3 As such, phenomenology is presented as a 
radically new philosophical study of life in itself, one that aims to expose the essential structures 
of factical life through phenomenological investigations of life experience. Through each text, 
Heidegger presents the growing method of phenomenology each time in a more robust fashion 
than the last as his careful attention to the method itself produces more precise phenomenological 
demonstrations. For Heidegger, these explications of factical life in itself begin to indicate the 
potential for phenomenology as a method of philosophical thinking to provide a direct access to 
life in its very being through a hermeneutic of the facticity [Faktizität] of factical life [faktischen 
Lebens] – the phenomenological exemplar for explicating the lived experience of human 
existence.4 These initial indications towards phenomenology as a path to ontological thinking 
appear as early as 1919/20 in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58) and indeed serve as 
a horizon for phenomenological philosophy that emerges out of factical life in itself.  5  In this 
manner, through phenomenology Heidegger begins to articulate a philosophical study of the 
 
3 GA 58: 65/51, (my brackets). 
 
4 For further discussion on facticity, see François Raffoul, “Factical Life and the Need for Philosophy,” in 
Rethinking Facticity, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson, (Albany: SUNY, 2008), 69-85.   
 
5 GA 58: 148/114, 156/120. 
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“being of life”6 and ultimately the being of human existence as the “being-there of Dasein”7 
through ontology.  
Phenomenology thus receives its merit as a radically new method of philosophical 
thinking in its original access to the phenomenological and ontological structures of life. 
However, as Heidegger indicates in GA 58: “the most burning, most original, and ultimate basic 
problem of phenomenology…is it itself for itself.”8 Thus, before phenomenology can begin its 
positive work, it must first take itself up in an address of its own history. To this extent, in each 
work presented in this project Heidegger expresses emphatic impressions on the task of 
phenomenology and philosophy to gain such genuine and original insight into philosophical 
questioning that first articulates and rethinks the tradition of philosophy as the historical 
progression of thought. At the same time, and in various degrees, the progression of these 
introductions for the most part follows a concrete presentation of the historical context 
surrounding the subject-matter of the lecture, accompanied by Heidegger’s direct indication of 
the faults of the tradition in the misunderstanding and mistreatment of philosophical problems 
 
6 Martin Heidegger, Phanomenologie des religiösen Lebens, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 241, 
Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), 181, hereafter referenced as GA 60. 
7 Martin Heidegger, Ontologie - Hermeneutik der Faktizität (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), 29, 
Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 
24, hereafter referenced as GA 63. The term Dasein, literally translated as ‘there-being,’ emerges in Heidegger’s 
work from its traditional German usage as a neutral word to express existence and its related phenomenological 
usage to indicate an intentional position from which lived experience is had. As the texts progress, Heidegger begins 
to thematize Dasein as a proper entity, one which becomes his favored term to express the human being in its mode 
of existence. Dasein is thus, even in its ontological formulation, at all ends a term that describes a basic 
phenomenological situation of human lived experience.  
 
8 GA 58: 1/2. 
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spanning back to the Ancient Greeks. In this manner, as Heidegger writes: “There is no iurare in 
verba magistri [swearing to the words of a master]”9 in phenomenological philosophy.  
Indeed, as it serves phenomenology as a method to philosophy, this ‘destruction’ 
[Destruktion] of the tradition of philosophy remains an essential starting point for Heidegger into 
the 1920’s as it provides a historical context of ideas through which the original questions of 
philosophy may be rescued by phenomenology.10 And indeed, as the phenomenological method 
becomes Heidegger’s path to ontology, as it will be shown in the next chapter, destruction 
remains a critical concept for the critique of the history of philosophy that is proper to a new 
encounter with being and human being through Dasein. With respect to this matter of access to 
philosophical problems from the tradition, Heidegger even takes the situation of the university 
itself as a facet of the historical context of thinking. In this manner, philosophy as the pursuit of 
the history of philosophy, alongside what Heidegger calls ‘university-philosophy,’ is thus 
distinguished from genuine and original philosophizing.11 In a word, Heidegger brings this 
matter to the fore by asking: “[Can] a philosophizing still be genuine and original if it entrusts 
the situation of its basic experience to an accidental institution that arose historically and has 
 
9 GA 58: 6/5. 
 
10 A list of historical destructions in each text featured here is as follows: GA 58: History of Phenomenology and 
Philosophy, 1-24/1-17; GA 59: Problem of History, 60-86/46-69, Problem of Lived Experience e.g. Natorp, 92-
148/73-114, e.g. Dilthey, 149-174/128-142; GA 60: Philosophy of Religion e.g. Ernst Troelsch, 19-26/14-19, 
Interpretations of Augustine, 159-164/115-119; GA 61: Reception of Aristotle, 4-9/5-10, Method of Philosophy, 11-
26/11-22; GA 63: Traditional Concept of Hermeneutics, 8-14/6-10, History of Phenomenology, 67-77/53-60, 
Traditional Concept of Man, 21-29/17-24, Misunderstandings of Subject-Object Relation, 81-83/62-64; GA 17: 
Consciousness and Being e.g. Husserl, 41-107/32-77, 269-290/208-221, Consciousness and Being e.g. Descartes, 
108-269/79-207. GA 20: Philosophy as Scientific Philosophy e.g. Brentano and Husserl, 22-33/18-26, Major 
Breakthroughs in Phenomenology, 43-103/27-75, Historical Development of Phenomenology e.g. Aristotle and 
Husserl, 103-122/75-89, Method and Aims of Phenomenology e.g. Husserl, 123-202/90-150. 
 
11 Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische 
Forschung, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1985), 46-49, 62-73 Phenomenological Interpretations of 
Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2009), 36-37, 47-55, hereafter referenced as GA 61. 
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perhaps now reached the end of its existence?”12 The task of philosophy as a phenomenological 
endeavor thus receives its most vital charge prior to any methodological demonstration - it must 
begin self-critically if it is to begin at all with any certainty towards its access to life and to being 
in an originary retrieval of thought.  
Heidegger’s phenomenological path to philosophy as it is characterized by these early 
texts exhibits a mode of thinking that is in constant change as it proceeds as directed from an 
intimate encounter with the ‘things themselves.’13 Thus, from a deeply reflective approach to 
philosophy, Heidegger achieves much through the phenomenology of factical life as it leads his 
thinking towards ontological considerations on the being of Dasein – the being-there of human 
being. To illustrate Heidegger’s progression of phenomenology from original science of factical 
life to the hermeneutics of facticity, I will present the development of the phenomenological 
method in the following way.  
In “Description and ‘Taking-Notice,’” I will present the first formulation of the 
phenomenological method as a mode of explicating life in itself through descriptions of factical 
life experience as presented in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58). In doing so, it 
shall be made clear in what manner Heidegger’s early thought is understood as one that emerges 
from life itself, and with an “attitude which is constantly checking and revising”14 of 
philosophical tradition, remains riveted to it. Following these matters, in “Destruction and 
Formal Indication,” I shall present Heidegger’s critical path to securing original 
 
12 GA 61: 68/52. 
 
13 See GA 58: 24/17 for Heidegger’s use of “an den Sachen” in reference to Husserl’s famous phrase, “Wir wollen 
auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen [We must go back to the things themselves].” Edmund Husserl, Logische 
Unterschungen, (Max Niemeyer, 1913), Erste Teil, Zweiter Band, 6, “Logical Investigations,” trans. J. N. Findlay, 
(New York: Routledge, 1982) Part 1, Vol 2, 168.  
  
14 GA 58: 25/21. 
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phenomenological access to philosophical problems veiled and distorted from the tradition as 
presented in Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59) and Phänomenologie 
des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). It will be shown from these texts in what manner ‘destruction’ is 
to be understood as a method of phenomenology, alongside its relation to ‘formal indication,’ 
and its importance in these early stages of Heidegger’s thinking. Here, destruction first appears 
through Heidegger’s critique of philosophical tradition, allowing an original encounter with the 
origin of concepts to be made possible.  
In “Hermeneutics,” I shall present the phenomenological method of hermeneutics as a 
mode of critical interpretation that provides Heidegger an immediate path to the ontological 
possibilities of the phenomenology of facticity as expressed in Phänomenologische 
Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung (GA 61), and 
Ontologie - Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63). These two sections provide decisive 
presentations of Heidegger’s development of the phenomenological method towards ontology 
via analyses of the being of factical life through Dasein. Following these explicit presentations of 
the phenomenological method, I shall then in “Phenomenology as Such” present Heidegger’s 
formal considerations on phenomenology from Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung 
(GA 17) and Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20) as it reaches a mature 
definition with respect to this progression of method, leading further towards a clear engagement 
with Dasein and the question of being (Seinsfrage) through phenomenology. In the end, these 
matters will further serve to prepare for the following chapter, “Phenomenology as the Method 
of Ontology.” Thus, it shall be revealed overall that the essential question of the being of Dasein, 
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as it characterizes Heidegger’s ontological thinking, is one that can only begin to be articulated, 
let alone answered, through phenomenology and the hermeneutics of factical life.15 
Description and ‘Taking-Notice’ 
I begin then in the Winter semester of 1919/20 with Heidegger’s first major lecture 
course on phenomenology, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 58). Here, Heidegger 
presents his early considerations on the method of phenomenology as ‘the original science of 
factical life’ – a mode of philosophical thinking that seeks to establish the study of life as the 
origin of all philosophical problems. In this manner, by providing vivid descriptions of his 
everyday, trivial activities and guiding the audience through a radical shift in outlook towards 
such experiences, Heidegger articulates in what manner the method of phenomenology opens a 
path of access to life through its manifestations in experience as life ‘in itself.’16 As Heidegger 
writes: “We go along in the factical life-experiences and see if, in them and just in them, an 
original articulation of life indicates itself.”17 Thus, by his demonstrations of phenomenological 
description in the ‘taking-notice’ [Kenntnisnahme] of life’s appearance through personal 
experience, Heidegger further extracts the phenomenal character of life in itself by establishing 
an absolute context of activities beyond any individual perspective. Phenomenology, in this early 
formulation of method, hereby seeks to render the structures of life in itself apparent through a 
descriptive recounting of one’s own experiences in factical life in such a manner as to render 
from one’s personal life, life in itself – to use Heidegger’s terms, to render the ‘esoteric 
 
15 For further discussion see John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994.); Scott Campbell, Heidegger’s Early Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and 
Language, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012.); Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest 
Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, (Albany: SUNY, 1994). 
 
16 See GA 58: 32-34/26-27 for further discussion on everydayness. 
 
17 GA 58: 157/121. 
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disposition’ of factical life as an ‘exoteric determination’ of life in itself through 
phenomenological description.18 Thus, from a “critical destruction of this [self-world]”19 the 
phenomenon of life in itself can appear and be explicated through an overall ‘reduction’ of its 
essential phenomenal structure.20   
 Continuing to express the role of phenomenological description for the task of an original 
science of factical life, Heidegger explains: “Life – my life, your life, their life, our life…we 
want to get to know in its most general typicality and, indeed, in such a way that we remain in it, 
looking around in it in its way [in seiner Weise]….”21 From this comment, Heidegger thus begins 
his explication of life in itself with an impression upon following and responding to life exactly 
as it gives itself, a task achieved through phenomenological description. In this manner, 
Heidegger directs us further: “We will look for ourselves at ‘life in itself’ and then see if we find 
in it a particular character, one that matter-of-factly demands a clear-cut, conceptual, and 
meaningful circumscription…which is both coming from the things themselves and is taken from 
them…”22 Having presented this, the proper mode of access to life in itself, Heidegger then 
proceeds to demonstrate phenomenological descriptions of everyday trivial activities in his own 
life from out of which life in itself is to appear in its phenomenal character.  
 
18 GA 58: 6/5. 
 
19 GA 58: 139/107. 
 
20 It is worth noting that Heidegger is attentive to the relation in the phenomenological method of reduction, 
construction, destruction as early as 1919 (see GA 58: 121/95, 123/96, 147/113, 151/116) though it does not become 
a thematic process of the method until 1927. See Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 26-32, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 18-23, hereafter referenced as GA 24.  
 
21 GA 58: 30/25. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
 
14 
 
 For the first description, Heidegger begins with the experience of a visit – details of his 
own life from which the reflection on experience can be grasped as such. His description is as 
follows: “[Looking] at books together, viewing pictures, drinking tea, smoking cigarettes; 
thereupon, taking a walk together; the weather brightens up, the sun comes through, the sun sets, 
it is becoming brisk…”23 From this occasion, Heidegger impresses once more that what is 
decisive for phenomenology is not the specific details themselves indicating his personal 
activities, but rather that from these what is given overall is “a context of experience in which I 
am fully engrossed.”24 Thus, these seeming trivialities become of extreme phenomenological 
importance for the explication of life in itself, as the context of experience presents a path of 
access to its phenomenal character. To thus access life in itself, the critical element of 
phenomenological description must be employed. As Heidegger states, an essential change in 
attitude takes place through phenomenological description which he terms ‘taking-notice’ 
[Kenntnisnahme], more commonly understood as perusal. In this manner, through the 
recollection of events one is given access to the context of one’s life experiences in a thematic 
way from which life in itself may be glimpsed.25 Heidegger expresses this essential shift in 
attitude through the character of ‘taking-notice’ in the following manner, itself a description: 26 
 
23 GA 58: 115/90 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 This is indicative of the relation between the two words for experience Erlebnis, as eventful or ‘lived’ experience, 
and Erfahren, as ‘mere’ experience or cognizance. There is a long history in phenomenology, especially in Husserl’s 
Ideen of the emphatic differentiation between the two as indicative of a phenomenological shift in the natural 
attitude that conditions the experiences themselves for further explication. However, in this part of the text, 
Heidegger remains with the usage of Erfahren as it conveys a non-objectifying character in its relation to ‘taking-
notice’ or perusal [Kenntnisnahme] (see translator’s forward, GA 58: x).  
 
26 In this manner, phenomenological description plays a similar role in both Heidegger and Husserl as it is invoked 
in order to demonstrate the phenomenological method itself, indeed through a sub-demonstration of the operation of 
reflection upon experience. See Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1913), 48-56, “Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology and 
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“In the evening I am asked: What did you do this afternoon? – and I recount the visit and the 
stroll; or in the evening I contemplate it for myself, I let it drift past me, or I write down what 
happened to me in my diary – overall: I take-notice of it by recounting, orally or in writing, or 
contemplatively.”27 Thus, the factical experience itself does not change in content. Rather, 
through recounting and indeed reliving the experiences as experiences of factical life, the attitude 
towards such events is modified. The experiences themselves are exalted from disconnected 
trivialities to events of factical life under a thematic context.28  
 Turning towards the access of life in itself through the context of experience, Heidegger 
thus proceeds with the following phenomenological description: 
After the lecture I come out of the university building; over there I see an acquaintance 
greeting me; I return the greeting; passing by the Colosseum I hear music; it occurs to me 
that I want to go to the theater this evening, that I want to attend to this and that, that I 
cannot come in too late; in the meantime it occurs to me that in a portion of the lecture, I 
did not bring out the formulation in such a way that it adequately rendered what was 
being examined; walking on, I live in that which I still want to attend to from beforehand; 
in the course of this, I see people and go into a cigar store on the street corner, buy myself 
Swiss stogies, listen to the gentleman behind the store-counter animatedly recount the last 
football match; what he is recounting interests me, how he is recounting it does not; as I 
pack up, I only see how he becomes more and more animated and excited about the 
brilliant performance of a halfback.29  
From this description, Heidegger seeks what is precisely at stake concerning the 
phenomenological explication of life from the context of experience. Through the shift in attitude 
towards the content of life through ‘taking-notice,’ an essential discovery of the ‘how’ of factical 
 
Phenomenological Philosophy,” trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 91-96, hereafter 
referenced as Ideen.  
 
27 GA 58: 115/91. 
 
28 See GA 58: 116-122/91-95 for a discussion on ‘taking-notice’ as a counter-measure to absorption in factical life 
experience. Heidegger’s here echoes Husserl’s understanding of the ‘incompleteness of experience’ and the 
necessity for reflection in phenomenology, Ideen, 82/127, at GA 58: 116/91: “When I perceive, I do not remember; 
and when I remember, I do not perceive.”  
 
29 GA 58: 103/82. 
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life become accessible. In this manner, as Heidegger writes: “The idea of phenomenology is: the 
original science of life…What is to be researched, rather, is life as arising, as emerging out of an 
origin.”30 Thus, the phenomenological method of description firstly grants an access to the 
context of life’s content without the strict emphasis on one’s own personal relations. In this 
manner, a ‘destruction’ [Destruktion] of personal context takes place from which the remaining 
absolute context of life experience can undergo a reduction towards the character of life in itself. 
As Heidegger writes: “[Life] as arising out of it can be deepened, which is ultimately possible 
only in this way: that life is itself taken back into the origin in its whole facticity…The idea is of 
such an absolute science of life, not of this or that factical, individual life.”31  
 In explicating the phenomenon of life as it appears as the absolute context of life 
experience as such, Heidegger returns to the previous description to amplify what is self-evident 
of life in the experience. In response, he thus states: “You, he, she, we always live in a direction 
[Richtung]…usually in such a way that we are not even explicitly aware of the direction. I can 
explicitly place myself into it, but it can also come upon me or sneak up on me or simply be 
there, yet in such a way that…a direction explicitly [ausdrücklich] engrosses us….”32 He 
continues: “One has particular convictions [Überzeugungen] and ideas [Ideen] of and about that 
which encounters me in life…One is thrown this way and that by oppositions 
[Gegensätzen]…One gets wrapped up in something, is caught up [gefangen] in something (or en-
snared) [be-fangen]…one is happy about life…[then] once again it’s agony.”33 These are not 
 
30 GA 58: 81/65. 
 
31 GA 58: 86-87/69. 
 
32 GA 58: 32/26. 
 
33 GA 58: 32-33/27, (my brackets). 
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mere general statements, nor are they private reflections from Heidegger’s own intimate life 
experience. Rather, as phenomenological descriptions, they are indications of the appearance of 
life in itself in the ‘how’ of its manifestation. Thus, Heidegger delimits the phenomenal character 
of life in itself: “[It] has a basic aspect, this life, which we will designate as its ‘self-sufficiency 
[Selbstgenügsamkeit]….’”34 He continues: “Self-sufficient…its intentional structure [has] a basic 
directedness in each case and always into a world…This ‘form’ is the mode of life’s own 
direction, which it even takes right where it wants to fulfill and satisfy itself. Structurally, it does 
not need to come out of itself….”35 Life, full of its own comings and goings, thus pulls us along 
in it through this essential directedness as it needs nothing else to be itself.   
Following this explication of the self-sufficiency of life in itself, another aspect of its 
phenomenal structure becomes apparent. As Heidegger writes:  
Thus, all kinds of things, which lie in the circle of each one of us, and in the circle that is 
always going along with life streaming forth: our environing world [Umwelt] – 
landscapes, regions, cities and coasts; our with-world [Mitwelt] – parents, siblings, 
acquaintances, superiors, teachers, students, officials, strangers…our self-world 
[Selbstwelt] …my personal rhythm.36  
In this manner life’s self-sufficiency which comes into view through the phenomenological 
method of ‘taking-notice’ through description, appearing from one’s own factical life experience 
in a personal context of meaningfulness, is further manifest in its worldly character. It is thus not 
only the sheer vitality of life’s directedness that draws our activities in its flow, such that we are 
seldom aware of it ourselves, but the very character of the ‘in which’ that factical life occurs 
means that what and wherein we are directed towards life are the manifold worlds of life in itself. 
 
34 GA 58: 30/25. 
 
35 GA 58: 31/25. 
 
36 GA 58: 33/27, (my brackets). 
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As Heidegger writes: “Our life is our world, which we seldom see, but rather always…‘are by 
it’: ‘captivated,’ ‘repelled,’ ‘enjoying,’ ‘renouncing.’ ‘We are always somehow encountering.’ 
Our life is the world…And our life is only lived as life insofar as it lives in a world.”37  
 Thus, the critical matter of the phenomenology of factical life becomes apparent: 
Through these investigations which have brought the self-sufficient and worldly characters of 
life in itself into view through ‘taking-notice,’ the first formulation of the phenomenological 
method has been presented in its expression and demonstration as phenomenological description. 
In this manner, through an essential shift in attitude towards one’s own experiences, an absolute 
context is laid open for further work upon extracting life in itself as a basic phenomenon. This 
initial state of phenomenology is an essential point of departure for the following texts to be 
presented as outgrowths of this basic position.  
Though the thematic demonstration of phenomenological description shortly falls away, 
the structural relations that lie as its ground remain in Heidegger’s phenomenological thinking as 
an essential approach to philosophy and factical life.38 Following the matters presented in this 
text, Heidegger continues to develop the phenomenological method to expand the power of 
phenomenological destruction briefly indicated here.39 Indeed, following its appearance in GA 
58, phenomenological destruction takes on a very specific meaning and method for Heidegger in 
the lectures to follow, Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59) and 
 
37 GA 58: 33-34/27.  
 
38 See GA 63: 90-92/69-70 for further demonstration of phenomenological descriptions. For further discussion, see 
Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 
103-110, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel, (Bloomington: Indian University 
Press, 1992), 75-80, hereafter referenced as GA 20. 
 
39 See GA 58: 22/17,120-122/ 94-95, 160/115, 156/120, 160/123, 163-134/125-126 for Heidegger’s mention of 
destruction in 1919/20.   
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Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60). Here, Heidegger presents individual stages of 
phenomenological destruction through demonstrations to isolate phenomena and prepare the way 
to an original encounter with them – beyond the initial dual-meaning of destruction whereby 
phenomenology makes its ‘fresh start’ and the personal context of factical life experience is 
destroyed to reach the phenomenon of life in itself. 
Thus, in GA 59 Heidegger presents and demonstrates the four steps of phenomenological 
destruction that overall aim at extracting the original problems of philosophy as they arise out of 
factical life, and as such have been misshapen by the history of philosophy. In this manner, what 
emerges from the process of phenomenological destruction is an original understanding of the 
‘problem-situation’ for philosophy, one that point towards a new direction in thought – the 
concrete historical Dasein in its factical existence. Following this, Heidegger then employs 
phenomenological destruction as he approaches the task of radically rethinking the philosophy of 
religion through phenomenological interpretations of religious experience detailed by Paul and 
Augustine. Here, Heidegger appears to utilize the newly discovered method of destruction but 
focuses his explicit remarks on the method of formal indication and its relation to 
phenomenological destruction.  
Despite its mention throughout GA 59,40 formal indication here receives explicit attention 
as Heidegger expresses it as a precursor to destruction, one attends to the specific relational 
element of phenomena to experience, what Heidegger calls the “‘how’ I stand with regard to 
things….’”41 Here, one attends to a phenomenon as it is initially understood by a provisional 
 
40 See Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1993) 75, 85-86, 97, 112, 172, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, trans. Tracy Colony, 
(New York: Continuum, 2010), 57, 65-66, 77, 87, 132, hereafter referenced as GA 59. 
 
41 GA 60: 12/9.  
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fore-having or pre-understanding from which a primary access to the original content of 
phenomena may be achieved.42 In this manner, through phenomenological destruction and 
formal indication, the philosophy of religion provides an essential ground for the rethinking 
philosophical tradition and the further explication of concrete historical Dasein through 
phenomenological interpretations expressing fundamental characteristics of the being of factical 
life, opening the way for further ontological explications.    
Destruction and Formal Indication 
 In Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (GA 59), Heidegger introduces 
destruction as a phenomenological method that arises out of a necessity for philosophy to free 
itself from the constraints of history given by the philosophical tradition. Here, Heidegger 
identifies that it is thus from lived experience itself, not from any historical situation, that 
philosophy must make its way towards its original problematic ground. In this manner, as 
Heidegger expresses, philosophy as phenomenology must thus think itself anew – and it is 
precisely from this “wanting-to-become-free from an un-genuine, non-primordially appropriated 
tradition”43 that destruction is employed. Methodologically, destruction is first understood and 
employed as an address of history itself, as Heidegger indicates: “The past newly grows towards 
every living present…The fundamental sense of intellectual history…is pre-delineated 
[vorgezeichnet] by the living preconception that leads and guides all understanding.”44 Thus, in 
order that phenomenological philosophy begin as a rethinking of traditional philosophy, and 
 
42 For further discussion, see Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal 
Indications,” in Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 47, No. 4, (Philosophy Education Society, 1994), 775-795.  
 
43 GA 59: 5/3. 
 
44Ibid. 
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remain a study of ‘basic problems,’ this methodological destruction of history must be properly 
expressed and demonstrated.  
It is thus from this initial historical destruction that the second aspect of destruction is 
then employed – the four-stage isolation and pursuit of an original encounter with phenomena. 
To accomplish this, Heidegger first addresses the positive sense of destruction as a revelatory 
method of phenomenology regarding history:  
Phenomenological destruction – as a fundamental part of phenomenological 
philosophizing – is therefore not without direction; it does not fortuitously take up 
meanings of words in order to explain them by means of other taken up meanings. It is 
not mere shattering but a ‘directed’ destruction [Abbau]. It leads into the situation of the 
pursuit of the pre-delineations, of the enactment of the preconception and thereby of the 
fundamental experience.45  
As directed by such destruction, Heidegger proceeds with the phenomenological task of 
addressing the problem situation of philosophy exemplified by problems of the a priori and life 
experience – from which the phenomenological destruction will be conducted through the 
respectively designated phenomena of history and factical life experience. Through a destruction 
of these two problems, Heidegger thus seeks to identify the issues within the tradition of 
philosophy that hinder a phenomenological thinking of factical life and bar a proper and original 
access to the understanding of lived experience as a source for philosophical questioning. In the 
initiation of this task, Heidegger presents the four stages of phenomenological destruction in the 
following way: “1. initial specification of the ambiguity, 2. first bringing-out, 3. pursuit of the 
pre-delineations, 4. understanding of the preconception.”46 
 
45 GA 59: 35/25. 
 
46 GA 59: 41/29.  
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To address the first problem of the a priori, Heidegger begins a phenomenological 
destruction of the phenomenon of history. In the demonstration of the destruction, Heidegger 
carries out each step as previously listed in a rigorous manner. He thus begins with the first step, 
the initial ‘specification of ambiguity,’ by presenting six different meanings of history, 
“meanings that all, however, point back to a unitary sense-complex….”47 In this manner, 
Heidegger enumerates various significations that appear in the word-concept ‘history’ with the 
intention of following their direction towards an original meaning. However, as he remarks on 
the method: “One may be tempted to search for the common – that is, for what history means in 
general…One sees immediately that it does not work like this. One is automatically led to ask 
from where those different meanings each time attain their sense and where the primordial sense 
lies…that is, the ‘origin’ from which they grow.”48  
With this in mind, Heidegger presents the following phrases: “I. When I say: ‘My friend 
studies history…’ II. Someone…is given the advice: ‘Just orient yourself a bit in the history!...’ 
III. One speaks of ‘history-less…’ [having] no history…’ IV. Again…as life’s great 
instructor…V. One means something else when one says…“This person has a sad history…’ 
VI… ‘A very unpleasant story [Geschichte]….’49 Following this, as the mere specification of 
ambiguity is not enough, Heidegger then moves on to the second stage of the destruction as the 
‘first bringing-out of the pre-delineations’ still contained “within the ambit of the understanding 
in factical life experience….”50 From these ambiguities, Heidegger presents the following pre-
 
47 GA 59: 43/33. See GA 20: 99-102/72-75 for a later address of the understanding of the a priori.  
 
48 GA 59: 49/37. 
 
49 GA 59: 43-44/33-34. See François Raffoul, “Heidegger and the Aporia of History,” in POLIGRAFI, no. 16, 
(2011.) pp. 91-118 for discussion on Heidegger’s different usage of Historie and Geschichte for ‘history.’  
 
50 GA 59: 44/34. 
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delineations of history as: 1. The science of history, 2. A field of facts, 3. Tradition, 4. The 
instructor of life, 5. Personal historical past of factical life, 6. An incident which concerns me.51  
The task of the destruction now turns towards the third stage, ‘pursuing the pre-
delineations’ towards the explication of the overall sense-complex. At this stage, the pre-
delineations appear more sharply defined, in part through the phenomenal explication of ‘having’ 
with respect to history. The six pre-delineations are presented by Heidegger as follows:  
1. History as theoretical attitudinal complex, as a concretizing logic of a domain of 
subject matter. 2. History as that which is past…a whole of being as something that has 
become… 3. History as one’s own past in the correlate of the preserving and constantly 
self-renewing taking-along: tradition, 4. History as past which is not one’s own…self-
worldly directed tendencies of Dasein in the correlate of the being-familiar that takes 
guidance from itself. 5. History as ownmost past in the correlate of ‘having’ that is 
motivated in only self-worldly directed tendencies. 6. History as occurring in the event 
character [Ereignischarakter] of factical life related to factical self-world, with-world and 
environing world.52  
As these significations are directed towards an essential unitary sense-complex, the process of 
phenomenological destruction must then turn towards an articulation of these significations 
towards an original preconception by way of relation. In this manner, Heidegger, then searches 
through the relations expressed by each sense-complex indicated in the pre-delineations of 
history for one relation which provides the grounds for a deeper phenomenological 
characterization. Heidegger thus determines this essential relation as that of ‘enactment,’ as the 
relations of history are understood “by the manner in which it is had, is experienced.”53 In this 
manner, the six detailed pre-delineations are assessed according to the criteria set forth by the 
 
51 GA 59: 44-48/34-37. 
 
52 GA 59: 59/45-46. 
 
53 GA 59: 60/46. 
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characterization of enactment for the destruction to proceed towards the phenomenological 
origin correlating to ‘self-worldly Dasein.’54  
Heidegger thus presents the mark of criteria as follows: “An enactment is primordial 
if…it requires…an always actual renewal in a self-worldly Dasein. It does so precisely in such a 
way that this renewal and the ‘necessity’…of renewal inherent in it co-constitutes this self-
worldly existence.”55 What is at stake here is the indication of a pre-delineation of history which 
expresses an original preconception from the sense-complex, and at the same time presents itself 
as co-constitutive of Dasein itself – meaning, that in the experience of Dasein in its factical life, 
the enactment provides an experience of Dasein’s selfhood as something it ‘has.’ Thus, 
Heidegger reviews the sense-complexes indicated by the significations of history and discovers 
this exact character of ‘having’ that satisfies the criteria of enactment. In addressing the fifth 
sense-complex of history as ownmost past Heidegger expresses the following:  
In case V. there is a sense of enactment that comes even closer to the primordial, so that 
here past is had as the ownmost one and this having, in fact, enacts itself in such a way 
that the ownmost past also loses the environing worldly character into which the self-
worldly instances of meaningfulness constantly fall back.56  
Here, destruction appears yet again in terms of rendering an individual experience-context into 
an explicit experience-context as such,57 however it is here expressed through the explication of 
enactment: “Case V. is situated closest to the primordial – and is still not the primordial itself – 
pure self-worldly meaningfulness.”58 In this sense, the idea of an absolute context, a pure self-
 
54 GA 59: 75/57. 
 
55 Ibid.  
 
56 GA 59: 83-84/64 
 
57 Thus, the role of destruction for phenomenology in GA 58. 
 
58 GA 59: 84/64 
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worldly meaningfulness appears again as the original access to life phenomenologically. Yet, the 
sense of enactment given here clearly reaches the character sought in the destruction, as 
Heidegger writes: “The enactment is in each case and necessarily such that what has been self-
worldly meaningful arises again in it…I seize my own past so that again and again it is had for 
the first time and that I myself am always affected anew by myself and ‘am’ in renewed 
enactment.”59  
The method of phenomenological destruction is thus a clear path of revision and 
indication to address the intimations given by a pre-understanding that traditional philosophy 
encapsulates in a veil of historical progression. As it concerns the destruction of the concept of 
history at hand, it thus reaches its end through this indication of the primordiality of the sense-
complex given by the pre-delineation of history as enacted in the ownmost past of historical 
Dasein. As these considerations bring Heidegger’s task further along in explicating the original 
preconception, we are indeed as Heidegger indicates ‘on the way’ to a phenomenological 
reduction which takes as its goal primordiality. In this manner, the phenomenological destruction 
of history has provided access into the primordial ground of the problem itself, which Heidegger 
articulates as “the human being in its concrete, individual historical Dasein.”60 In this manner, 
Heidegger’s demonstration of the method of deconstruction provides another concrete step in the 
progression of phenomenology, one that remains motivated by a basic tendency of rethinking 
philosophy out of its muddled history as it emerges out of life itself and establishing a method 
through which phenomena themselves can be recovered and revealed. As it concerns the positive 
destruction in this text, Heidegger indeed continues on to address the problem of lived 
 
59 Ibid. 
 
60 GA 59: 86/66. 
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experience through destructions of Natorp and Dilthey in their life-philosophies to explicate the 
essential problem of experience in factical life. Through these two destructions, Heidegger 
continues to delimit the essential problematic of Dasein, as he finds in the two philosophers that 
“[actual] Dasein does not come to its primordial due. [It] does not become a possible problem.”61  
Following this indication, Heidegger imparts that it is the task of philosophy, through 
phenomenology, to thus maintain its hold and its view on factical Dasein in its concreteness to 
prepare the way for a proper understanding of both the phenomenon of history and the historical 
character of each Dasein. In a flourish, Heidegger thus proclaims: “Philosophy is pervaded by a 
fundamental experience and must form itself in it in terms of content. Therefore there are no 
philosophical disciplines (such as logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion).”62 Rather, 
factical experience as the subject-matter of philosophy necessitates that concrete Dasein in its 
factical experience be taken phenomenologically as the primary charge. At the end of GA 59, 
Heidegger presents a last word on philosophy and phenomenology to reinforce this essential 
progression towards factical experience which explicates Dasein above all. “Philosophy has the 
task of preserving the facticity of life and strengthening the facticity of Dasein. Philosophy as 
factical life experience requires a motive in which the worry about factical life experience itself 
remains. We call this philosophical fundamental experience [Grunderfahrung].”63 As Heidegger 
thus expresses the state of philosophy in its relation to life itself, he once more impresses that the 
essential path of access to this entire philosophical domain is at all ends possible only insofar as 
philosophy proceeds phenomenologically. He writes: “It is the task of phenomenology to put 
 
61 GA 59: 170/130. 
 
62 GA 59: 172/131, (my emphasis). 
 
63 GA 59: 174/133, (my brackets). 
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itself into that tendency towards the actual primordial Dasein and to always from anew throw the 
torch into…philosophy.”64 
 Heidegger directly carries over the task of phenomenological destruction and the 
essential problem of explicating the facticity of Dasein in Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens 
(GA 60). As the texts is comprised of two major parts,65 the 1920/21 Winter semester lecture 
“Introduction to Philosophy of Religion” and the 1921 Summer semester lecture “Augustine and 
Neo-Platonism,” Heidegger’s aims are readily apparent in its two basic manifestations. In 
“Introduction to Philosophy of Religion,” Heidegger seeks to open a new path to theological 
understanding outside of traditional philosophy of religion through phenomenological 
interpretations of Paul’s letters to the Galatians and Thessalonians.66 Here, the essence of 
phenomenological interpretation is to understand the texts in question as expressions of factical 
experience from which life itself can be explicated. In looking to Paul for phenomenological 
explications of factical life with respect to history, Heidegger also seeks to indeed begin on a 
phenomenologically-oriented context, as Paul “has come to Christianity not through a historical 
tradition, but through an original experience.”67 In this manner, Heidegger continues to be guided 
by phenomenological destruction as he isolates key phenomena relevant to the lived experience 
of Paul’s relation to whom he is engaging in proclamation. To accomplish this, Heidegger 
presents the method of formal indication – a preliminary expression of the relations of 
 
64 Ibid., (my emphasis).  
 
65 There is indeed a third part, an outline to a lecture that was never delivered, “The Philosophical Foundations of 
Medieval Mysticism.”  
 
66 In this text, Heidegger also begins to radically distinguish philosophy from its previous appearance as a science, 
though this distinction appears in previous texts. See GA 58: 65-81/53-64, GA 59: 9-29/6-21, GA 60: 1-12/1-13. 
However, upon reaching a proper ontological understanding of phenomenology by GA 63, its character as a science 
returns.    
 
67 GA 60: 69/49. 
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significance in a concept that is heavily tied to destruction. Thus, through phenomenological 
destruction and formal indication, Heidegger begins to extract essential characteristics of factical 
life through the experiences of Paul that provide articulations for the factical situation of life in 
terms of being [Sein], providing a critical basis for his following interpretations of factical life in 
its own being through Augustine.    
 The progression of phenomenological destruction to GA 60 is apparent in the very 
introduction of the work as Heidegger remarks on the necessity to understand the three essential 
concepts at work in the lecture, “‘introduction,’ ‘phenomenology,’…and ‘religion.’”68 The path 
to understanding these, Heidegger writes, will be accessed through phenomenological 
destruction: “We will begin with the clarification of the meaning of words, but we will refer 
immediately to the connections among objects indicated in these meanings such that these 
connections will be put into question.”69 Although Heidegger does not continue to demonstrate a 
destruction of the concepts themselves to the same degree as in GA 59, he nevertheless indicates 
the route towards this understanding. Taking the concept of ‘introduction’ as his theme, 
Heidegger thus presents an initial destruction through the indication of ambiguities. He thus lists 
the significations of ‘introduction’ as: “a) the delimitation of the material domain…b) the 
doctrine of the methodological treatment of the material domain…determination (Feststellung) 
of the concept…c) the historical consideration of the previous attempts to pose and resolve 
scientific tasks.”70 
 
68 GA 60: 5/4. 
 
69 Ibid.  
 
70 GA 60: 5/4-5. 
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 Following these introductory matters, Heidegger moves towards a preparation of the first 
phenomenological interpretation of Paul. To accomplish this, Heidegger secures a core 
phenomenon from which the relation between Paul’s lived experience and factical life itself may 
be understood, and precisely as a relation. This phenomenon Heidegger indicates is the concept 
of history, as it readily appears prominent in Paul’s expressions of his experience. Thus, a 
destruction of the phenomenon of history must first take place to clearly elicit a significance that 
will further indicate the essential relation between experience and life in the phenomenological 
interpretation of Paul. As the relation itself is what is primarily at stake, Heidegger looks to the 
method of formal indication to inform the overall destruction, as a formal indication of the 
phenomenon of history will clearly delimit its position with respect to experience and factical 
life. In this manner, the phenomenon of history will be formally indicated, and thus properly 
understood in its own significance. To explain this process, Heidegger states: “The usual sense of 
the historical [das Historische] says it is the temporally-becoming, and as such, past…This sense 
of ‘historical’ is so general…that nothing would be lost if it were applied, without further 
qualification, to factical life experience.”71 Thus, rather than generally expressed in a manner that 
neglects the precise articulation of ambiguities in the method of destruction, the concept of 
history will be expressed in a formal manner as a relational indication.72  
Heidegger thus brings formal indication to bear as a proper stage of phenomenological 
method as it draws-out from an initial access a pre-given understanding of the relational 
significations in the concept of history, and in doing so it precisely “brings no preconceived 
 
71 GA 60: 55/38. 
 
72 See GA 60: 55-65/38-45 for Heidegger’s further discussion on the distinction between general and formal 
indication.  
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opinion”73 to the extraction of meaning. To address history by way of formal indication, 
Heidegger thus begins:  
Each experience – as experiencing, and what is experienced – can be ‘taken in the 
phenomenon,’ that is to say, one can ask: 1. After the original ‘what,’ that is experienced 
therein (content). 2. After the original ‘how,’ in which it is experienced (relation). 3 After 
the original ‘how,’ in which the relational meaning is enacted (enactment).74  
Phenomenology, as “the ‘λόγος’ of the phenomena”75 in explicating the ‘how’ of the content of 
factical lived experienced, thus indicates the relational element here between history and factical 
life. Thus, this relational element of the manner of experiencing – the “‘how’ I stand with regard 
to things’”76 – is what the formal indication seeks to make explicit through what in destruction is 
called the ‘initial drawing-out of the pre-delineations’. As it regards history, Heidegger writes: 
“If the historical is taken as the formally indicated, it is not thereby asserted that the most general 
determination of the ‘historical’ as a ‘becoming in time’ delineates a final sense…Rather, the 
problem of time must be grasped in the way we originally experience temporality in factical 
experience….”77  
 As a destruction of the phenomenon of history through formal indication only serves the 
greater task of illustrating the relation between experience and factical life through 
phenomenological interpretations of Paul, Heidegger departs from these explicit considerations 
on formal indication.78 In this manner, Heidegger now employs the previous formal indication of 
 
73 GA 60: 55/38. This statement bears heavy similarity to the character of phenomenology in Husserl as ‘prior to all 
theory’ (Ideen, 52/95).  
 
74 GA 60: 62-63/43. 
 
75 Ibid. 
 
76 GA 60: 12/9. 
 
77 GA 60: 64-65/44. 
 
78 For further discussion on formal indication, see GA 61: 26-36/22-28, 140-155/104-115; and GA 63: 78-80/61-62.  
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history to precisely view the relation between Paul’s experience and factical life inasmuch as 
history serves as the primary expression of relation. Heidegger thus proceeds to identify the 
essential phenomenon of ‘proclamation’ as the “immediate life-relation of the world of self of 
Paul to the surrounding world and to the communal world of the community….”79 Proclamation 
as the locus of Paul’s factical experience thus provides a proper ground to view such relation 
through a phenomenological interpretation of Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians. Here, the 
preparations of the formal indication of history reach their completion, as the essential situation 
of Paul in his experience of proclamation to the Thessalonians is the experience of their ‘having-
become.’ Through this, the phenomenological interpretation thus reaches an ontological 
discussion concerning factical life through the expression of Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians. 
As Heidegger writes: “Having-become is not, in life, [just] any incident you like. Rather, it is 
incessantly co-experienced, and indeed such that their Being [Sein] now is their having-become 
[Gewordensein].”80 The essential relation of Paul’s experience to factical life itself, given by the 
situation of proclamation, is thus his experience of the Thessalonians in their ‘having-become.’ 
In a word, “Their having-become is their Being now.”81   
It is thus through these phenomenological interpretations that Heidegger begins to 
articulate the investigation of factical life in terms of being, thus introducing an approach to 
ontology through phenomenology. Indeed, these ontological matters provide Heidegger with a 
critical lens for his phenomenological interpretations of Augustine in the following 1921 
Summer semester lecture of GA 60 where the original problem of a concrete historical Dasein as 
 
79 GA 60: 80/55. 
 
80 GA 60: 94/66. See GA 60: 75-105/52-74 for further discussion on phenomenological interpretation itself and the 
characterizations of factical life produced through the explication of Paul’s factical experience.  
 
81 Ibid. 
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expressed in GA 59 can be provisionally attended to. Here, in “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,” 
Heidegger continues in this fashion to actualize the potential for phenomenological 
interpretations to produce characterizations of the being life seen in the previous work on Paul. 
From these interpretations, Heidegger thus conducts a phenomenological investigation on the 
essential manifestations of life itself given in factical experience. In this manner, from the 
experiences of Augustine, Heidegger highlights an essential character of factical life expressed 
as the ‘having-of-oneself’ that brings to vision “the concrete ‘worldly’ experiential complex of 
enactment”82 of life experience. Through further interpretations of Augustine guided by the 
elucidation of the ‘having-of-oneself’ Heidegger presents a wealth of phenomenological 
explications characterizing the factical situation of existence thematized as “Dasein, the self the 
being-real of life….”83 In this manner, factical life in itself ultimately reaches a thematic 
articulation, of the ontological situation of facticity that now presents itself as the essential task 
of explication. This, Heidegger expresses as “a certain How of the being of life”84 that is 
manifest in factical life experience as the object of phenomenology.  
In this manner, Heidegger’s path becomes clear as he continues phenomenological 
interpretations towards ontological characterizations of factical life in the Winter 1921/22 lecture 
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (GA 61). Here, taking Aristotle as his guide, 
Heidegger proceeds to explicate the essential categories of Dasein’s factical life in a progression 
of the work thus far on explicating the phenomenon of life in itself. Following this text, both the 
 
82 GA 60: 243/182. 
 
83 GA 60: 228/170. See GA 60: 52-54/35-37 (§10: “The Concern of Factical Dasein”), GA 60: 193-246/141-184 for 
further discussion of ‘tendency-to-secure,’ ‘concern,’ ‘curiosity,’ and ‘absorption’ that will become critical 
existential determinations of Dasein in its being in Sein und Zeit (GA 2).    
 
84 GA 60: 242/181.  
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process of phenomenological interpretations and their ontological import become explicit themes 
for Heidegger in the presentation of a new formulation of phenomenology through the method of 
hermeneutic interpretation. Thus, in Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63) Heidegger 
presents the essential problematic of explicating the being of human existence as Dasein through 
phenomenology, opening the path towards ontology.  
Hermeneutics 
 In the 1921/22 Winter semester lecture Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu 
Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung,85 Heidegger begins by delimiting 
the essential task of the work to form a “concrete philosophical problematic…[of] Aristotelian 
philosophy”86 through phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle that constitute a state of 
original concrete philosophizing out of factical life in itself. In this manner, Heidegger proceeds 
towards a greater task of clearly delimiting the relation between philosophy and ontology 
through phenomenological explications of life. In turn, through the thematization of the factical 
life of Dasein expressed in terms of Aristotle’s categories, Heidegger reaches a new development 
of the phenomenological method as he discovers a mature form of phenomenological 
interpretation through hermeneutics. 
To begin these phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle on the way to ontology, 
Heidegger first conducts two phenomenological explications that extract the sense of 
‘philosophizing’ and ‘life’ from their given pre-conceptions. In this manner, Heidegger first 
 
85 It is worth noting that in the following 1922 Summer semester, Heidegger delivered a similar lecture titled 
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation, (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), hereafter referenced as GA 62. This change in subtitle from “Introduction to 
Phenomenological Research” to “Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation” expresses the thematic shift of 
Heidegger’s treatment of factical life ontologically via hermeneutics developed in GA 61.  
 
86 GA 61: 13/12. 
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attends to an understanding of what it means ‘to philosophize,’ as opposed to the pursuit of the 
history of philosophy, by examining its historical origin in factical life as expressed by Plato. 
Here, through presenting the meanings of ϕιλοσοϕία [philosophy], ϕιλόσοϕος [philosopher], 
ϕιλοσοϕεîν [to philosophize], and ϕιλοσοϕία μουσική [musical philosophy].87 Heidegger reaches 
the essential concept of ‘comportment’ [Verhalten] as a relational determination. As he writes: 
“This comportment is expressed in a special manner when we say that ‘studying philosophy’ 
must be a real ‘philosophizing,’ That means: what we relate to…is such that it determines, from 
its own character, the comportment toward it. The object gives the comportment a name….”88 
This sense of relation that philosophizing holds through comportment is exceptionally decisive, 
for as Heidegger finds, the essential comportment that philosophizing maintains in its relation to 
factical life is determined by a sense of being [Sein]. Thus: “The object [Gehalt] of the definition 
of philosophy is therefore determined as…comportment [Verhalten] to beings in terms of Being 
[als Sein von Seiendem].”89  
Following these considerations, Heidegger then boldly expresses what has become 
evident through this notion of comportment for philosophy – “Philosophy is ‘ontology,’ indeed, 
is radical ontology, and as such is phenomenological…The object of philosophy, being in their 
Being, co-determines from out of itself…the comportment.” In this manner, and through the 
second phenomenological explication of the signification of life as “existence, ‘being’ in and 
 
87 GA 61: 48-50/37-38. 
 
88 GA 61: 51/39.  
 
89 GA 61: 58/44, (my brackets). I have inserted the original German in brackets to indicate the linguistic relation 
between both object and comportment, Gehalt and Verhalten, and the two senses of being, Sein and Seiendem which 
the translator has rendered as ‘Being’ and ‘beings.’  
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through life…”90 Heidegger arrives at a new articulation of the philosophical problem at hand in 
the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle: “[To] bring to experience life, as factical life, 
in its objectivity and Being”91 and in doing so, “to take up the question of the objective and the 
ontological character of ‘life.’ The Being of life as its ‘facticity.’”92 
Having clearly delimited the route ahead, Heidegger proceeds to explicate the essential 
categories of facticity through phenomenological investigations of life in itself. Though Aristotle 
is not invoked through phenomenological interpretations to the extent of Paul or Augustine, 
Heidegger nonetheless provides a robust account of factical life in its categories of world, caring 
[Sorgen], and ruinance [Ruinanz] as a clear progression in the positive philosophical discoveries 
of his phenomenological thinking.93 In this manner, the ‘hermeneutical situation’ of factical life 
has been articulated through the philosophical link between phenomenology and ontology. Thus, 
in the following 1922 Summer semester Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 61), 
Heidegger then seeks a proper ontological understanding of life through a hermeneutics of 
human existence, Dasein, in its essential factical character as made possible through the initial 
considerations of GA 61. In this manner, phenomenology will achieve its full progression as a 
philosophical method of ontology through the hermeneutical method, granting Heidegger an 
access to Dasein through which an articulation can begin to emerge concerning its being.  
 
90 GA 61: 84/64. 
 
91 GA 61: 116/86. 
 
92 GA 61: 113/85. 
 
93 Heidegger addresses the categories of factical life in GA 61 as follows: World, 85-89/65-67; Caring, 89-99/67-75; 
Inclination, 100-102/75-77; Distance, 103-104/77-78; Sequestration, 105-108/78-81; The ‘Easy,’ 108-109/81-82; 
Retrospect and Prospect, 110-116/82-87; Relucence and Prestruction, 117-125/87-92; and Ruinance, 131-155/98-
115. It is also worth noting that here, Heidegger’s address of ‘caring,’ Sorgen (root, Sorge), changes from its 
previous appearance as Bekümmerung, ‘concern.’    
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 Heidegger begins with a remark on the meaning of ontology as the task ahead concerns 
attending to the being of life as facticity. He thus presents ontology in terms of a “doctrine of 
being”94 that from its root in the Ancient Greek word ὄν [being] indicates “a questioning and 
defining which is directed to being as such.”95 Relating to philosophy in terms of comportment 
towards beings themselves, if being is to be a possible theme, a proper methodological path is 
necessary. Thus, as Heidegger states, “it is only through phenomenology that the ontology 
corresponding to it is established on a secure basis and held on an orderly course in its treatment 
of problems.”96 In this manner, proceeding from the considerations of GA 61, Heidegger thus 
delimits that ontology, as a phenomenological endeavor, must take its domain of study from 
being itself made possible through Dasein itself “from out of which and for the sake of which, 
philosophy ‘is.’”97 The overall task of an ontological understanding of factical life must thus 
clearly proceed through a phenomenological investigation of Dasein, as Heidegger terms it, a 
hermeneutic of facticity. To express the structure and aim of this task, Heidegger provides 
preliminary remarks on the nature of the hermeneutical method and the meaning of facticity.  
He begins: “‘Facticity’ is the designation we will use for the character of the being of 
‘our’ ‘own’ Dasein.”98 In this manner, as Heidegger expresses, what is decisive is not the 
individual character of Dasein’s being as our own, but rather that it indicates a primary 
awareness as a “how of being.”99 Thus, it will be in addressing the critical ‘being-there’ [Da-
 
94 GA 63: 1/1.  
 
95 Ibid.  
 
96 GA 63: 2/2. 
 
97 GA 63: 3/2.  
 
98 GA 63: 7-8/5.  
 
99 Ibid.  
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sein] that the phenomenological hermeneutic will take its ontological charge. Heidegger 
continues on to explain the nature of hermeneutics in relation to the task at hand. Through a 
discussion of the origin of ἐρμηνευτιχή [hermeneutics] from its root ἐρμηνεύειν [interpreting] in 
its Ancient Greek usage, Heidegger determines four critical significations that point toward a 
unified meaning. In this manner, he states: “Hermeneutics is now no longer interpretation itself, 
but a doctrine about the conditions, the objects, the means, and the communication and practical 
application of interpretation.”100 In this manner, hermeneutics as a phenomenological method 
will serve as the mode of access to Dasein itself as a ‘self-interpretation.’ Heidegger explains this 
in the following manner: “Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case 
our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being…”101 In this 
manner, the ontological task of explicating Dasein in its being hermeneutically will not amount 
to an interpretation of itself from without, but rather from an interpretation seated in a “how of 
Dasein itself.”102 Heidegger expounds upon this until arriving at a critical determination on the 
structure of the interpretation of hermeneutics as a self-interpretation of Dasein. As he writes: 
“[Interpretation], which is itself part and parcel of the ‘being there of Dasein…shares in the 
character of Dasein’s being….”103 Thus, in this manner, interpretation belongs to the being of 
Dasein itself as a facet of human existence.  
 
100 GA 63: 13/10. See GA 63: 9-20/6-16 for Heidegger’s full discussion on the origin and structure of hermeneutics, 
especially through a presentation of λόγοσ [discourse] and άληθεύειν [being-true] as ‘revealing the unconcealed as 
such’ at GA 63: 11/8.    
 
101 GA 63: 15/11. 
 
102 GA 63: 15/12. 
 
103 GA 63: 16/13. 
 
 
38 
 
As the nature of the hermeneutic of facticity has itself been provisionally establish with 
respect to Dasein, Heidegger proceeds to presentations on the structure of the interpretation 
itself. Here, as he writes: “Our theme is Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular 
time. And our task: to bring this into view, have a look at it, and understand it in such a manner 
that in itself its basic characteristics of its being are able to be brought into relief.”104 Thus, 
through hermeneutics, Dasein will be addressed as it shows itself in its being as being-there – 
that is to say, phenomenologically. Moving further ahead towards the concrete hermeneutic, 
Heidegger makes the following critical expression. As the interpretation will be conducted 
through the observation of Dasein as it readily presents itself in its ‘everydayness’ 
[Alltäglichkeit], its primary manner of appearance, “the Dasein of today is to be interrogated by 
interrogating today’s historical consciousness and philosophy…which is to be subjected to a 
destruction….”105 In this manner, the being of Dasein will be explicated phenomenologically as 
it is self-evident in Dasein itself. However, as Heidegger clarifies, this self-evidence is precisely 
not what first appears. It must therefore be indicated how in everydayness, Dasein’s being is 
concealed from immediate view.106 The hermeneutic of Dasein thus seeks to radically establish 
an access to its being, as Heidegger writes: “[Hermeneutics] calls itself interpretation, i.e., it does 
not merely depict matters in terms of the aspect under which they first appear…One must step 
away from the subject matter initially given and back to that onto which it is based.”107  
 
104 GA 63: 47/37. 
 
105 GA 63: 48/38-39. 
 
106 See GA 63: 74/59 for an indication of the ‘fallenness’ of tradition, GA 63: 76/60 for an indication of the ‘self-
veiling’ of being, and GA 63: 88-92/67-70 for phenomenological descriptions of everydayness that further illustrate 
this point.   
 
107 GA 63: 77/60. Here, Heidegger indicates a decisive move for phenomenology in reference to his earlier works 
and to Husserl by invoking the necessity for a modification of comportment in the approach to phenomenon. See 
 
 
39 
 
Thus, given this clarification, Heidegger proceeds with a discussion addressing the nature 
and structure of phenomenology itself with respect to the approaching hermeneutic of Dasein. 
Here, both ‘phenomenology’ and ‘phenomenon’ will be presented in a major determination from 
Heidegger that proves essential to the progression of the method. To accomplish this, Heidegger 
once again begins by sourcing the origins of phenomenology from the Ancient Greek 
φαινόμενον [phenomenon] as it derives from φαίνεσθαι [showing itself]. In this manner, 
Heidegger provides an explication of the meaning of phenomenology based on this linguistic 
origination by first expressing: “A phenomenon is thus that which shows itself as something 
showing itself…[it] is a mode of being-an-object and indeed a distinctive one….”108 Passing over 
the history of phenomenology in its determination of the significations of ‘phenomenon,’ 
Heidegger then states: “‘Phenomenon’ is thus not primarily a category, but initially has to do 
with the how of access, of grasping and bringing into true safekeeping. Phenomenology is 
therefore initially nothing more than a mode of research, namely: addressing something just as it 
shows itself and only to the extent that it shows itself.”109  
Having sufficiently prepared the way for the hermeneutics of facticity from which the 
being of Dasein is to be explicated, Heidegger puts these phenomenological considerations to 
work as he now attends to Dasein in its everyday being-there. In this manner, guided by the 
formal indication: “the being-there of Dasein (factical life) is being in a world [Sein in einer 
Welt].”110 Heidegger delves into descriptions of everydayness from which several key 
 
GA 2: 27-39/26-37 for Heidegger’s development of this concept as disclosure [Erschliessen] in his presentation of 
the phenomenological method of investigation. 
 
108 GA 63: 67/53. 
 
109 GA 63: 71/56. 
 
110 GA 63: 80/62, (my brackets).  
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ontological determinations are extracted.111 Heidegger thus provisionally explicates Dasein’s 
being-there, factical life itself, through the mode of everydayness through hermeneutics, 
providing another critical demonstration of phenomenology in its progression towards a method 
of ontology.  
 Heidegger’s presentation of this lecture in the 1923 Summer semester marks a decisive 
achievement in the progression of his phenomenological thinking as an approach to philosophy. 
The initiation of phenomenology as the path to ontology alongside the resulting determinations 
made in explicating the factical life of Dasein in its being-there provides an essential 
demonstration of the power of Heidegger as a phenomenologist and indeed announces a radical 
new direction for his philosophical work. Following this lecture, Heidegger presents two more 
lectures concerning the reworking of the definition of phenomenology as an outgrowth of his 
critiques of the tradition of philosophy on the way to a complete formulation of phenomenology 
as the method of ontology and the thinking of being through Dasein. Thus, in Einführung in die 
phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17) and Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 
20), the formulation of a proper understanding of phenomenology in its ontological possibility is 
taken as Heidegger’s major project, addressing key figures in the history of philosophy 
responsible for both the progression and mischaracterization of phenomenology and ontology. In 
his address of these mistakes in the tradition, Heidegger propels phenomenology ahead through 
new definitions that secure methodological access to the growing project of an existential 
ontology of the being of Dasein.  
 
 
111 Heidegger addresses the phenomenon of Dasein’s everyday being-there in GA 63 as follows: World, 84-92/65-
71, Significance, 93-96/71-74, Disclosedness, 97-98/74-76, Familiarity, 99-100/76-77, and Caring, 100-104/77-80.  
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Phenomenology as Such 
 Heidegger begins Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung by expressing the 
objectives of the work as an address of phenomenology, as it originates in Aristotle’s De Anima 
through a discussion of ϕαινόμενον [phenomenon] and λόγοσ [discourse], and of Husserl’s 
breakthroughs in the development of phenomenology. At heart, what these matters aim to secure 
is that phenomenology be properly formulated as a method of “understanding life in itself in its 
genuine being and answering the question of its character of being.”112 Thus, Heidegger begins 
his analysis into the origin of phenomenology on the way to a proper understanding of its 
relation to being. He writes: “Phenomenology is put together from λόγοσ and ϕαινόμενον. 
Φαινόμενον means: something that shows itself. Φαίνομαι is the same as ‘to show itself,’ ϕαίνω 
the same as ‘to bring something to the light of day.’ The stem is ϕα; this is connected with ϕῶς 
which is the same as light, daylightness.”113 What is decisive here, as Heidegger indicates, is that 
daylight is not something seen itself – rather, it provides the condition for other things to appear 
in it. Thus, Heidegger writes: “Aristotle discovered that daylightness is not a body…that it does 
not move, but is instead the heaven’s actual manner of existing, allowing things to be seen, the 
day’s being. Daylight is a manner of presence….”114  
In this way, Aristotle is only speaking of daylight as it shows itself: “Daylight does not 
move. Only the sun moves, the presence of which is the daylight. Whoever says that daylight 
 
112 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1994), 275, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), 211, hereafter referenced as GA 17. 
 
113 GA 17: 6-7/4. 
 
114 GA 17: 7-8/5. 
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moves is speaking παρὰ τὰ ϕαινόμενα, he is speaking past what shows itself.”115 From these 
considerations, Heidegger then extracts the precise relation between the phenomenon and being 
itself. In this manner: “Φαινόμενον is what shows itself of itself as existing; it is encountered by 
life insofar as life stands towards its world in such a way that it sees the world, perceives it at all 
in the αἴσθεσις [perception].”116 It is thus delimited that phenomena serve as the basis for a study 
of beings in their primary manner of appearance, as Heidegger writes: “The expression 
ϕαινόμενον is accordingly not a conceptual category, but instead a manner of being, how 
something is encountered and, indeed, encountered in the first and, as such, first legitimate 
way.”117 He continues: “Τα ϕαινόμενα [that which shows itself] can be represented by τὰ ὄντα 
[that which exists]; it is what is always already here, what we encounter the moment we open our 
eyes. It does not need first to be disclosed, but is frequently covered up.”118  
 Heidegger then examines the counterpart term of phenomenology, λόγοσ. He begins: 
“Φωνή [phonē]…is a type of sound made into something animate, a noise made by something 
living…A sound is made when something in something knocks on something…The voice, 
however, is in with the being of something living…”119 To thus grasp λόγοσ by way of voice, it 
is thus in returning back to human being that its meaning is made clear. Here, it is precisely the 
worldly character of human existence that delimits the signification of the voice as λόγοσ. As 
Heidegger writes: “Insofar as a human being is in the world and wants something in the world 
 
115 GA 17: 9/6. 
 
116 GA 17: 11/8, (my brackets). 
 
117 GA 17: 14/10. 
 
118 Ibid., (my brackets).   
 
119 GA 17: 14-15/10.  
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and wants it with himself, he speaks. He speaks insofar as something like a world is uncovered 
for him as a matter of concern and he is uncovered to himself in this ‘for him.’”120 However, as 
Heidegger clarifies, the voice of the human being is no mere tool for speech. Rather, “Language 
is the being and becoming of the human being himself.”121 The λόγοσ is thus not simply a 
property – it is the expression of being itself through the voice. In this manner, the λόγοσ thus 
serves phenomenology as it presents what shows itself, exists, ϕαινόμενον. Heidegger presents 
this revelatory character of speech in the following manner:   
We have determined ϕαινόμενον to be what shows itself as immediately existing (the 
world is meant). In relation to what exists in this way, talking has a special function. The 
λόγοσ ἀποϕαντικός [revelatory speech] is the sort of talking with the world, by means of 
which the existing world is pointed out as existing. (Ἀποϕαίνεσθαι is “letting something 
be seen from itself in its way of existing).”122    
These initial explications of phenomenology’s origins in ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ provide a key 
direction towards an ontological conception of the methodology. Having prepared these matters, 
Heidegger then proceeds to address Husserl’s phenomenological developments ultimately aimed 
at indicating the lack of attention to being in his phenomenology.123  
As these matters serve to thus establish a further understanding of phenomenology, 
Heidegger proceeds in the 1925 Summer semester Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs 
(GA 20) to drastically expand on this critique of the development of phenomenology, resulting in 
further considerations on the phenomenological method itself and its relationship to ontology. 
Here, Heidegger begins by addressing the breakthroughs in phenomenology made by Husserl 
 
120 GA 17: 16/12. 
 
121 Ibid.  
 
122 GA 17: 21/15, (my brackets). Heidegger indicates that this is not the only mode of discourse. For ‘deception,’ see 
GA 17: 25-41/18-31.   
 
123 See GA 17: 42-107/32-77, 270-290/208-221 for further discussion of Husserl.  
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and for the most part of the introductory matters discusses phenomenology using Husserl’s 
terminology.124 From these considerations Heidegger then presents another explicit discussion on 
the method of phenomenology, largely progressing from the linguistic origin found in Aristotle 
from GA 17. However, progressing from these initial considerations, Heidegger expresses an 
immensely rich formulation of phenomenology and the phenomenological method on the way to 
a critical review of the history of phenomenology from which the explication of Dasein in its 
basic constitution of ‘being-in-the-world’ [In-der-Welt-sein] may begin – bringing forth a new 
era in Heidegger’s phenomenological thought. As he writes: “There is no ontology alongside 
phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology.”125 
 Heidegger begins with an expansion of his initial considerations on ‘comportment’ as an 
essential directedness towards the world as he finds this concept more robustly expressed 
through Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Here, what is decisive for Heidegger is that 
intentionality, from intentio meaning literally “directing-itself-toward”126 as the essential 
comportment in all lived experience does not simply grasp things perceptually, but rather it 
apprehends what appears as ‘bodily presence’ [Leibhaftigkeit].127 As Heidegger writes, in this 
manner “the entity which presents itself as perceived has the feature of being bodily-there 
[Leibhaft-da]. Not only is it given as itself, but as itself in its bodily presence.”128 To illustrate 
 
124 See GA 20: 34-103/27-75 for further discussion on intentionality, categorial intuition, and the a priori as major 
discoveries in phenomenology.  
 
125 GA 20: 98/72. 
 
126 GA 20: 36/29. 
 
127 As much of this text is devoted to presenting the discoveries and indicating the issues in the development of 
phenomenology, for specific discussion on intentionality in Husserl see GA 20: 34-63/27-47.   
 
128 GA 20: 53-54/40-41. 
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this, Heidegger gives a phenomenological description of a perceived entity – a chair. His 
description is as follows:  
What do I see in my ‘natural’ perception in which I now live and dwell and am here in 
this room; what can I say about the chair? I would say that it stands in Room 24 next to 
the desk, and it is probably used by lecturers who prefer to sit while they lecture. It is not 
just any chair but a very particular one, the desk chair in Room 24 at Marburg University, 
perhaps somewhat worse for wear and poorly painted in the factory from which it 
evidently came.129 
In this manner, the comportment towards the world manifest through perception thus grasps the 
chair as it is given, and as such, in its bodily presence. Thus, as Heidegger thus writes: “What is 
perceived in this ‘natural’ perception we shall designate as a thing of the environing world, or 
simply the environmental thing.”130 In its particular bodily-givenness, the chair itself thus 
becomes a possible perceptual given as a thing of the environment. 
 As this concerns the definition of phenomenology, Heidegger proceeds with these matters 
to a discussion of what is at stake concerning this understanding of intentionality. As he writes: 
“Such a directly seeing apprehension and accentuation is traditionally called description. 
Phenomenology’s mode of treatment is descriptive. To be more exact, description is an 
accentuating articulation of what is in itself intuited…the description is analytical.”131 In this 
manner, from such direct ‘self-apprehension’ of what is given as description Heidegger states: 
“Phenomenology is the analytic description of intentionality in its apriori.”132 Having established 
an understanding of the relation within phenomenology, Heidegger proceeds to a proper 
 
129 GA 20: 48-49/37-38. See GA 63: 88-92/67-70 for Heidegger’s explanation and demonstration of accurate and 
inaccurate phenomenological descriptions. 
 
130 GA 20: 49/38. 
 
131 GA 20: 107/78. 
 
132 GA 20: 108/79. 
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discussion of its meaning. Here, phenomenology is once again traced back to its linguistic 
origins as found in Aristotle.133 Thus from ϕαινόμενον [that which shows itself] in its combined 
presentation with λόγοσ [discourse] in its revelatory character as ἀποϕαίνεσθαι [letting the 
spoken be seen in itself],134 ‘phenomenology’ then expresses itself as “letting the manifest in 
itself be seen from itself.”135 This however, Heidegger indicates, says nothing more than “back to 
the matters themselves”136 or defining phenomenology as “the science of phenomena.”137 Thus, 
Heidegger reaches a critical consideration concerning the definition, and thus the procedure of 
phenomenology.  
On this, he writes: “The term ‘phenomenon’ however says nothing about the being of the 
objects under study, but refers only to the way they are encountered.”138 What is decisive for 
phenomenology is thus the ‘how’ of the encounter with respect to the appearance of phenomena. 
It is thus critical for phenomenology to begin by securing a proper access to phenomena, as 
Heidegger writes: “Admittedly, what can in itself be exhibited and is to be exhibited can 
nonetheless be covered up…As research work, phenomenology is precisely the work of laying 
open and letting be seen, understood as the methodologically dismantling of concealments.”139 
With this essential explication of phenomenology, Heidegger proceeds to address the 
development of phenomenology to precisely indicate the moments of error where an original 
 
133 See GA 20: 111-115/81-84 for further discussion.  
 
134 GA 20: 116/85. 
 
135 GA 20: 117/85. 
 
136 Ibid.  
 
137 GA 20: 111/80. 
 
138 GA 20: 118/86. 
 
139 Ibid. 
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phenomenological understanding was missed or concealed.140 Following this, Heidegger then 
moves towards the core work of GA 20, the phenomenological explication of the ontology of 
Dasein in its basic constitution of being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein] and the exposition of the 
phenomenon of time through temporality as the horizon of Dasein’s being.141 In this task, 
Heidegger produces a wealth of ontological determinations on the being of Dasein through 
being-in-the-world that serve to present the full power of phenomenology as a method to 
ontology through a provisional explication that will become the essential content for Heidegger’s 
famous 1927 publication Sein und Zeit (GA 2). 
 
 
140 See GA 20: 123-182/90-131 for further discussion.  
 
141 See GA 20: 346-442/251-320 for further discussion.  
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Chapter 2: Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology  
My task in this chapter is to present Heidegger’s development of the phenomenological 
method as it appears in his major works from 1927-1929. Through an examination of key texts 
from this time, it will be shown how phenomenology serves Heidegger as the method of 
ontology, one that seeks to disclose the being of beings towards an understanding of being itself 
through Dasein. In this manner, phenomenology is first presented as “the way of access to, and 
the demonstrative manner of determination…of ontology”1 for Heidegger’s initial project of the 
Daseinanalytik in his first major publication Sein und Zeit (GA 2) in the Spring of 1927, through 
which the question of being itself [Seinsfrage] can be addressed. Following this, in the 1927 
Summer semester lecture course Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24), Heidegger 
begins to focus on the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis] that makes possible such a 
relation to being, indeed for the task of formulating four new basic problems of phenomenology. 
In this work, phenomenology is thus further presented as a three-fold method of ontology that 
begins with the appearance of beings and works towards being itself through the stages of 
reduction, construction, and destruction. From this direct methodological formulation, Heidegger 
begins to reconsider the object of phenomenology and ultimately repositions its essential task, 
stating: “being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy…philosophy is not a science of beings 
but of being…ontology.”2  
 
1 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), 35, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 35, hereafter referenced as GA 2. I have elected the use of Joan Stambaugh’s 2010 
translation of Sein und Zeit over John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson’s. However, alongside the original German 
edition, the Macquarrie-Robinson translation was still referenced for comparison during research. I have continued 
my citations using the German/English pagination with Stambaugh’s translation.  
 
2 GA 24: 15/11. For further discussion, see William Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2003). 
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Heidegger then gains a new thematic understanding of the aim of phenomenology as the 
“radical grounding of the possibility of ontological knowledge”3 from the 1927/28 Winter 
semester lecture Phenomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 
25). From this task, he indicates two essential philosophical problematics: the possibility of 
ontological knowledge and the resulting problem of the ‘knowing comportment,’ the 
transcendence of Dasein, which makes possible any relation to being whatsoever. Finally, from 
these essential ontological problematics discovered through phenomenological interpretations of 
Kant’s Critique, Heidegger develops a direct means of addressing the possibility of the 
Seinsverständnis through an understanding of metaphysics from the Ancient Greek μετά τά 
φυσικά as “inquiry beyond or over beings”4 to being itself. Expressed in Was ist Metaphysik? 
(GA 9), his inaugural lecture upon succeeding Husserl as professor at Freiburg University, it is 
here that phenomenology reaches a critical stage of development from its original position in 
ontology as the method of the disclosure of being through beings. For here, as the approach to 
philosophy through metaphysics, phenomenology becomes the essential disclosure of the 
possibility of being through the unfolding [Entfaltung] and indeed self-unfolding of the nihilating 
character of the ‘nothing’ [das Nichts].5 
As it has been made clear in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s development of 
phenomenology as the method of ontology indeed begins well before the publication of Sein und 
 
3 Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1995), 431, Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 292, hereafter referenced as GA 
25. 
 
4 Martin Heidegger, “Was ist Metaphysik?” in Wegmarken, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 118, 
“What is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks, trans. David Farrell Krell, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
93, hereafter referenced as GA 9. 
 
5 GA 9: 103/82. 
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Zeit in 1927, famous for Heidegger’s address of being [Sein] through an analysis of human being 
[Dasein]. In fact, the early indications of this ontological direction of phenomenology appear as 
early as 19196 while much of the first division of Sein und Zeit appears in the 1925 Summer 
lecture Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20). However, as Sein und Zeit directly 
attest, it is this work itself that marks a critical stage of development for Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method. It is thus worth providing clarificatory remarks on the nature of 
phenomenological method in Sein und Zeit regarding its position in this development and its 
renown as Heidegger’s most famous work. Here, the method appears far less procedural as a 
result of a gradual progression throughout the preceding works and is rather guided by revelatory 
disclosure and hermeneutic interpretation as the nature of the works in this period reflect. 
Alongside this, Sein und Zeit is altogether different in its aim than earlier works that were for the 
most part concerned with presenting Heidegger’s considerations and demonstrations on the 
structure of the method itself. In this manner, beginning in 1927 phenomenology becomes far 
more radically understood in terms of examination and explication, investigation and 
interpretation, specifically as Heidegger employs it through the Daseinanaytik. Thus, in Sein und 
Zeit, much of the phenomenological method is understood entirely by its formal expression as: 
“ἀποϕαίνεσθαι τά φαινόμενα – to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself 
from itself.”7  
In this manner, the distinction between this stage of development with respect to the 
earlier formulation of the phenomenological method is made quite apparent: Beforehand, 
Heidegger would explicitly detail the methodological steps of phenomenological research to 
 
6 See Chapter 1, ftn. 3 for further discussion.  
 
7 GA 2: 34/32. 
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examine and explicate phenomena in their essential character, whereas in this text a budding 
phenomenologist may be left to question how and by what means the being of beings are to be 
made manifest, where the ‘four senses of World [Welt]’8 originate, how the ‘care [Sorge] myth’ 
stands as source of interpretation for Dasein’s being,9 or how the temporality [Zeitlichkeit] of 
Dasein is explicated from descriptions of the ‘everyday concept of time.’10 The considerations 
presented in the first chapter make-way towards understanding these, as this is by no means a 
fault on Heidegger’s part. As the task at hand in GA 2 is to utilize the method as a specific mode 
of ontological research, the discussion of phenomenological method therein is thus only to 
delineate the manner of approach to the Daseinanalytik. However, as I aim to make clear, there 
is far more of the phenomenological method to be ascertained than from Heidegger’s remarks, as 
it is unequivocally and foundationally ingrained in Heidegger’s thinking as his very approach to 
philosophy itself. It is thus from paying close attention to his remarks and with a watchful eye 
towards his operations that phenomenology as a method to ontology comes into its own. For the 
critical reader must not approach Sein und Zeit as the presentation of ‘a philosophy’ which has its 
meaning altogether in the understanding of worldview [Weltanschauung] that phenomenology 
directly avoids in its research. Rather, to fully understand Heidegger and indeed “better than he 
understood himself…”11 the ontological determinations of the structures of Dasein’s being must 
be approached as phenomenological considerations – a task that always requires the return to an 
understanding of phenomenology itself.   
 
8 GA 2: 64-65/64-65. 
 
9 GA 2: 197-198/190-191. 
 
10 GA 2: 407-409/388-389. 
 
11 GA 25: 3/2. 
 
 
52 
 
Thus, to illustrate Heidegger’s development of phenomenology as the method of 
ontology from the approach to the Daseinanalytik to the unfolding of being and the possibility of 
the Seinsverständnis through metaphysics, I will present this progression as follows:  
In “Investigation and Interpretation,” I will present Heidegger’s ontological 
understanding of phenomenology as expressed in the 1927 publication Sein und Zeit. Here, it 
shall be made clear in what sense phenomenology appears as the method of the disclosure of the 
being of beings understood through the combined sense of ϕαινόμενον [phenomenon] and λόγοσ 
[discourse], alongside Heidegger’s employment of phenomenological investigation and 
interpretation in the Daseinanalytik. Following these matters, in “Reduction, Construction, 
Destruction,” I will present Heidegger’s reformulation of the phenomenological method of 
ontology as expressed in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24). In this text, 
referring to the 1919/20 lecture of the same title, Heidegger seeks to explicate four basic 
problems of phenomenology from four traditional ontological theses through phenomenological 
interpretation. From this, I will show how Heidegger’s presentation of the three-fold 
phenomenological method of reduction, construction, and destruction makes possible an access 
to the Seinsverständnis through investigation into the appearance of beings that moves towards 
being itself.  
In “Interpretations of Kant,” I will present Heidegger’s essential considerations on the 
problem of ontological knowledge and the problem of the transcendence of Dasein, the ‘knowing 
comportment’ of the Seinsverständnis as expressed in Phenomenologische Interpretationen von 
Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25). From these matters it will be shown how 
phenomenology achieves a direct access to the possibility of ontology through the 
Seinsverständnis, preparing the way for an understanding of metaphysics as the thinking of being 
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beyond beings. Finally, in “Metaphysics,” these considerations will be brought to bear as 
Heidegger addresses the meaning of metaphysics in the inaugural lecture Was ist Metaphysik? 
(GA 9). From this text it shall be made clear in what sense Heidegger’s understanding of 
metaphysics as μετά τά φυσιχά, beyond beings, positions phenomenology as the essential 
method of ontology through the metaphysical unfolding of the nothing.     
Investigation and Interpretation 
 I begin with Sein und Zeit, Heidegger’s first major publication and indeed his first major 
display of the potential of phenomenology as an approach to philosophy and method to ontology. 
Here, Heidegger seeks an understanding of the being of Dasein, human being, through which an 
understanding of being itself can be made accessible. To accomplish this, Heidegger thus 
employs phenomenology as the method of ontology, which through investigation and 
interpretation of the being of Dasein, provides an manner of addressing traditional problematics 
of being [Sein], worldhood [Weltlichkeit], care [Sorge], and time [Zeit] in search of a new, 
authentic understanding of the being of Dasein and the meaning of being in general. To breach 
these matters and present Heidegger’s ontological understanding of phenomenology in Sein und 
Zeit, I will first present the appearance of phenomenology in Heidegger’s introductory remarks 
where phenomenology appears as employed by Heidegger as his direct approach to philosophy. 
In this manner, the structure of Sein und Zeit in its dual task of addressing the question of being 
[Seinsfrage] and Daseinanalytik will be exposed as fundamentally phenomenological itself.  
Phenomenology first appears at-work as the method to ontology in GA 2 as Heidegger 
begins the text in his usual fashion by emphatically calling attention to the most fundamental for 
philosophy, the Seinsfrage, and explicitly citing three prejudices maintained by the tradition of 
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philosophy that serve to neglect its appearance as a serious theme.12 Yet, as Heidegger expresses, 
before the question of the meaning of being can be attended to as such a basic problem of 
philosophy, and indeed through the analysis of the being of Dasein [Daseinanalytik], it first must 
me raised anew and properly understood. Thus, as Heidegger writes: “The question of the 
meaning of Being must be formulated. If it is a – or even the fundamental question, such 
questioning needs the suitable transparency.”13 Heidegger then proceeds to express the 
phenomenological structure of questioning itself, in order to present a proper understanding for 
the sake of formulating the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger thus states: “Every 
questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its lead beforehand from what is sought.”14 To 
further extract this phenomenon of questioning in its relation to what is questioned, Heidegger 
presents the three-fold structure of questioning centered on the German verb fragen [to question].  
Here, through modifications in its prefix, questioning receives its coordinate relations to 
what is questioned as Heidegger writes: “As questioning about…questioning has what it asks 
about [Gefragtes]. All asking about…is in some way an inquiring of…Besides what is asked, 
what is interrogated [Befragtes] also belongs to questioning…As what is really intended, what is 
to be ascertained [Erfragtes] lies in what is questioned; here questioning arrives at its goal.”15 To 
import this phenomenal structure of questioning to the ontological task of formulating the 
question of the meaning of being, Heidegger thus writes:  
What is asked about [Gefragtes] in the question to be elaborated is being, that which 
determines beings as beings…Hence, what is to be ascertained [Erfragtes], the meaning 
 
12 GA 2: 2-4/1-3. Here, Heidegger addresses three prejudices that have caused the question of being (Seinsfrage) to 
be forgotten – universality, indefinability, and self-evidence.  
 
13 GA 2: 5/4. 
 
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Ibid.  Note: this structure of questioning appears in this same formulation before in GA 20: 194-198/144-147  
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of being, will require its own conceptualization…Insofar as being constitutes what is 
asked about, and insofar as being means the being of beings, beings themselves turn out 
to be what is interrogated [Befragtes] in the question of being. Beings are, so to speak, 
interrogated with regard to their being.16 
In this manner, Heidegger expresses the essential character of questioning, anticipatory 
understanding,17 as that which will here direct the question of being through being itself, indeed 
as the being of some being. To further concretize these matters, Heidegger explains:  
Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being – one who questions – 
transparent in its being. Asking this question, as a mode of being of a being is itself 
essentially determined by what is asked about in it – being. This being [Seiende], which 
we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its 
being, we formulate terminologically as Dasein.18 
In this manner, what Heidegger expresses as the Seinsverständnis [understanding of 
being] is found to be an essential determination of Dasein’s very being.19 As he explains: 
[Dasein] is ontically distinguished be the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its 
very being […daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht].20 Indeed, it is 
this very ontological character of Dasein in its Seinsverständnis that prioritizes it for an access to 
being over other beings. However, as Heidegger expresses this distinction between Dasein and 
other beings, he at the same time provides a new essential and radical differentiation for 
 
16 GA 2: 6/5. 
 
17 Heidegger explains this further at GA 2: 5/4: “As seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. 
The meaning of being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way.” Note: the character of availability 
expressed in anticipatory understanding is the principle function of the for-having which makes possible destruction 
and formal indication on the basis of Dasein’s Seinsverständnis. Heidegger expresses this at GA 2: 8/7: 
“‘Presupposing’ being has the character of taking a preliminary look at being in such a way that on the basis of this 
look being that are already given are tentatively articulated in their being. This guiding look at being grows out of 
the average understanding of being in which we are always already involved and which ultimately belongs to the 
essential constitution of Dasein itself.”  
 
18 GA 2: 7/6-7.  
 
19 GA 2: 12/11“Understanding of Being is itself a determination of being of Dasein [Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine 
Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins]. 
 
20 Ibid. 
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phenomenological ontology which will later be understood as ontological difference.21 In this 
manner, as being [Sein] and beings [Seienden] – the ontological [ontologische] and ontical 
[ontisch] – are thus distinguished, Heidegger provides an essential differentiation that delimits 
the route of phenomenology. Thus, as what remains decisive in Sein und Zeit is the 
phenomenology of human being through Dasein, the investigation is properly understood as a 
phenomenological investigation into the appearance of Dasein as a being [Seiende] from which 
its being [Sein] can be explicated and understood through phenomenological interpretation. In 
this manner, Dasein has a direct access to being itself through this ontological difference as 
Heidegger states: “The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.”22 
Furthermore, as it serves the basis for this Daseinanalytik, Heidegger in this manner also 
distinguishes the task of an understanding of the being of beings from an understanding of being 
[Seinsverständnis] in general – what will soon after Sein und Zeit become the possibility of pure 
ontological knowledge.23 Thus, from an understanding of ontological difference, Heidegger 
imparts: “Thus fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can originate, must 
be sought in the existential analysis of Dasein.”24 
 From this initial display of phenomenology in Sein und Zeit – the traditional neglect of 
the Seinsfrage, the phenomenal structure of questioning, the priority of Dasein, and ontological 
difference – Heidegger then proceeds to address the manner of access to Dasein, outlining the 
 
21 See GA 24: 22-23/17 for further discussion  
 
22 GA 2: 12/11. 
 
23 This task is further outlined in GA 24 and 25, as addressed in the second and third sub-sections of this chapter.  
 
24 GA 2: 13/12. It is worth noting that through the existential component of the Daseinanalytik, what results through 
the ultimate considerations on authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] is a phenomenology that extracts authentic Dasein from 
its ownmost potentiality of being [eigenstes Seinkönnen]. Here, what is interesting is rather than destroying personal 
context as in GA 58, Sein und Zeit expresses a rendering of one’s context authentically as Dasein’s own.    
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nature of the Daseinanalytik and in doing so presenting the project of Sein und Zeit as a true 
work of phenomenology. Here, what is decisive is to choose the proper access to Dasein so that 
its relation to being will become manifest, self-evident with immediacy – to let Dasein ‘show-
itself’ in its predominant mode of being, and in this manner to situate phenomenology as the 
approach to a fundamental ontology. As Heidegger writes: “The manner of access and 
interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its 
own terms. And furthermore, this manner should show that being as it is initially and for the 
most part – in its average everydayness [durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit].”25 In this manner, as 
Heidegger has stated many times before, such an access does not come by first determining the 
investigation from without. As he writes: “Hence the first concern in the question of being must 
be an analysis of Dasein…Expressed negatively, no arbitrary idea of being and reality, no matter 
how ‘self-evident’ it is, may be brought to bear on this being in a dogmatically constructed 
way….”26 Rather, as Heidegger has developed phenomenology as the specific method to be 
employed, it is from a direct examination and explication, or in Heidegger’s words, investigation 
and interpretation into Dasein exactly as it shows itself.27  
 
25 GA 25: 16/16. Here, there is a similar altitudinal approach in the delimiting of the subject-matter of 
phenomenology as in Husserl’s Ideen. Yet, as this has been remarked in the previous chapter, it is worth noting that 
the essential nature of Heidegger’s employment of phenomenology has radically changed from its previous iteration 
concerned with the details of first-person factical life experience. However, the examination of Dasein that 
comprises GA 2 there are similar demonstrations given to isolate the structures of its being, albeit with far less 
detail.  
  
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Thus, the Daseinanalytik begins at a phenomenologically critical position itself, as Heidegger remarks at GA 2: 
15/15: “True, Dasein is ontically not only what is near or even nearest – we ourselves are it, each of us. 
Nevertheless, or precisely for this reason, it is ontologically what is farthest.” Indeed, this further serves the 
determination of Dasein’s phenomenal character of mineness [Jemeinigkeit]. For further discussion, see François 
Raffoul, “The Ontology of Mineness,” in Heidegger and the Subject, (New York: Humanity Books, 1998), 208-249.    
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Thus, with such an approach, Heidegger expresses in what manner he shall proceed in 
Sein und Zeit phenomenologically as he states: “By looking at the fundamental constitution of 
the everydayness of Dasein we shall bring out in a preparatory way the being of this being.”28 To 
accomplish this, Heidegger expresses that Dasein will be examined as it appears in such an 
average everyday mode of appearance – its primary mode of being and a fundamental structure 
of Dasein which he terms being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein]. Indeed, it is this coordinate 
structure that will be analyzed and through which Heidegger will explicate the phenomenal 
characteristics of Dasein’s being such as mineness [Jemeinigkeit], equipmentality 
[Zuhandenheit], worldhood [Weltlichkeit], care [Sorge], death [Tod], time [Zeit], and authenticity 
[Eigentlichkeit].29 However, before commencing with this task of investigation and interpretation 
of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, Heidegger provides two explicit methodological discussions that 
serve to characterize and guide the project of Sein und Zeit: the destruction of the history of 
ontology and the phenomenological method of investigation. I shall now present these explicit 
remarks by Heidegger that further serve to express phenomenology in its development as a 
method of ontology. 
 The concept of history and its specific role in phenomenological destruction has been 
already addressed directly in the previous chapter. However, it reaches a more radical and 
precise presentation in Sein und Zeit as Heidegger predicates his necessity for a fundamental 
ontology on the destruction of the history of ontology. In this manner, history is not only a 
phenomenon that serves to insight dogmatism in the tradition of philosophy, but as Heidegger 
 
28 GA 2: 17/17. 
 
29 This is not an exhaustive list of the phenomenal characters of Dasein’s being.   
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explains, it belongs as an essential element of the being of Dasein itself called historicity 
[Geschichtelichkeit]. As Heidegger writes:  
In its factical being Dasein always is how and ‘what’ it already was. Whether explicitly 
or not, it is its past…In its manner of existing at any given time, and thus also with the 
understanding of being that belongs to it, Dasein grows into a customary interpretation of 
itself and grows up on that interpretation…This understanding discloses the possibilities 
of its being and regulates them. Its own past…does not follow after Dasein but rather 
always already goes ahead of it.30 
In this manner, through Dasein’s essential character of historicity, its own past which manifests 
itself through tradition reaches it emphatically in its average everydayness. Thus, there are 
several critical consequences pertaining to the effects of historicity on Dasein. As Heidegger 
explains: “Dasein not only has the inclination to be entangled in the world in which it is and to 
interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light; at the same time Dasein is also 
entangled in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps. This tradition deprives Dasein of 
its own leadership in questioning and choosing.”31  In its most vindictive effects, as Heidegger 
expresses, tradition serves to dominate Dasein’s ontological pursuits in its concern over its being 
and in another form through its pursuit of the meaning of being in general. Heidegger explains 
this in the following way: “The tradition that hereby gains dominance makes what it ‘transmits’ 
so little accessible that initially and for the most part it covers it over instead. What has been 
handed down is handed over to obviousness; it bars those original ‘wellsprings’ out of which the 
traditional categories and concept were in part genuinely drawn.”32  
Thus, if the question of the meaning of being is to be raised anew in its own light through 
the revival of philosophy’s original experience and basic problems, this tradition is what needs 
 
30 GA2: 20/19. 
 
31 GA2: 21/20. 
 
32 GA 2: 21/20-21.  
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be radically destroyed. As Heidegger writes: “We understand this task as the destruction of the 
traditional content of ancient ontology which is to be carried out along the guidelines of the 
question of being. This destruction is based upon the original experiences in which the first, and 
subsequently guiding, determinations of being were gained.”33 Indeed, it is this manner that 
Heidegger presents destruction from its previous position in the development of the 
phenomenological method as he states: “Destruction does not relate itself in a negative way to 
the past: its critique concerns ‘today’ and the dominant way we treat the history of 
ontology…Destruction does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent.”34 
 Following these matters, Heidegger then turns towards an address of ontology itself in the 
analysis of the question of being through the phenomenological method. Here, phenomenology is 
delimited as the essential path towards ontology which Heidegger explains through the 
presentation of a steadily-developing analysis of the term phenomenology from the Ancient 
Greek ϕαινόμενον [phenomenon] and λόγοσ [discourse]. Thus, to prepare for the Daseinanalytik 
which shall be conducted phenomenologically, Heidegger proceeds with this discussion to reach 
an essential understanding of phenomenological investigation through unconcealment and 
disclosure through άλήφεια, an Ancient Greek concept of truth.35 Heidegger thus begins by 
expressing in what sense the treatment of the question of the meaning of being is to be 
phenomenological. As it follows his considerations on destruction of the tradition of ontology, 
Heidegger first delimits: “With this term the treatise dictates for itself neither a ‘standpoint’ nor a 
‘direction,’ because phenomenology is neither of these…The expression ‘phenomenology’ 
 
33 GA 2: 22/21-22. 
 
34 GA 2: 23/22. See Chapter 1: “Destruction and Formal Indication” for further discussion.  
 
35 See Chapter 1, “Hermeneutics” and “Phenomenology as Such” for further discussion of ϕαινόμενον, λόγοσ, and 
άλήφεια in GA 17 and GA 20.  
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signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the what of the object of 
philosophical research…but the how of such research.”36 In this manner, similarly to the 
phenomenal structure of questioning, phenomenological investigation thus remains guided solely 
by what is sought in the questioning itself.  
Thus, as Heidegger writes: “The more genuinely effective a concept of method is…the 
more originally it is rooted in confrontation with the things themselves and the farther away it 
moves from what we call a technical device….”37 Instead, and in this very sense, Heidegger 
expresses phenomenology through the traditional maxim ‘to the things themselves,’ which he 
explains in the following way: “It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental 
findings; it is also opposed to taking over concepts only seemingly demonstrated; and likewise to 
pseudo-questions which often are spread abroad as ‘problems’ for generations.”38  
 However, Heidegger remarks that this mere formulation of a maxim to guide 
phenomenological research has yet to penetrate the essential meaning of phenomenology. Thus, 
Heidegger proceeds with a presentation of the meaning of phenomenology to ground its guiding 
method. As he writes: “The expression has two components: phenomenon and logos. Both go 
back to the Greek terms ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ. Viewed extrinsically, the word phenomenology 
is formed like the terms theology, biology, sociology…Accordingly, phenomenology would be 
the science of phenomena.”39 Thus, Heidegger first addresses ϕαινόμενον in search of its 
meaning with respect to phenomenology. He writes:  
 
36 GA 2: 27/26. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 GA 2: 28/26. 
 
39 GA 2: 28/26-27. 
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The Greek expression ϕαινόμενον, from which the term ‘phenomenon’ derives, comes 
from the verb φαίνεσθαι, meaing ‘to show itself.’ Thus ϕαινόμενον means: what shows 
itself, the self-showing, the manifest. φαίνεσθαι itself is a middle voice construction of 
φαίνω, to bring into daylight, to place in brightness…Thus the meaning of the expression 
phenomenon is established as what shows itself in itself, what is manifest.40 
From this explanation, Heidegger continues to address the nature of phenomenon as the self-
showing with respect to its various modes of access and appearance. On this, he writes: “Beings 
can show themselves from themselves in various ways, depending on the mode of access to 
them. The possibility even exists that they can show themselves as they are not in themselves.”41   
In this manner, as Heidegger explains, rather the phenomenon appears as a semblance 
[Schein]: “In this self-showing beings ‘look like…’ Such self-showing [Sichzeigen] we call 
seeming [Scheinen]… ϕαινόμενον άγαθόν means a good that looks like – but ‘in reality’ is not 
what it gives itself out to be.”42 Heidegger then proceeds further to address the notion of 
appearance [Erscheinen] with respect to phenomenon, as he writes:  
Thus, one speaks of ‘appearances of symptoms of illness.’ What is meant by this are 
occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing as such ‘indicate’ 
something that does not show itself…Appearance, as the appearance ‘of something,’ thus 
precisely does not mean that something shows itself; rather, it means that something 
which does not show itself announces itself through something that does show itself. 
Appearing is a not showing itself.43 
Having determined the various understandings that arrive with the notion of ϕαινόμενον, 
Heidegger then presents its essential meaning with respect to phenomenology as a method. On 
this, he writes: “Phenomenon – the self-showing in itself – means a distinctive way something 
 
40 GA 2: 28/27. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 GA 2: 28-29/27. Here, Heidegger makes an emphatic note towards the basic relation between phenomenon and 
semblance. GA 2: 29/27: “Only because something claims to show itself in accordance with its meaning at all, that 
is, claims to be a phenomenon, can it show itself as something it is not, it can it ‘only look like…’ The original 
meaning (phenomenon: what is manifest [das Offenbare]) already contains and is the basis of ϕαινόμενον.” 
 
43 GA 2: 29/28.  
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can be encountered. On the other hand, appearance means a referential relation in beings 
themselves such that what does the referring (the announcing) can fulfill its possible function 
only if it shows itself in itself – only if it is a ‘phenomenon.’”44 Indeed, as it relates to the 
phenomenological investigation of Dasein, what is here decisive is that, like the distinguishing of 
ontological difference, what appears as phenomena are beings themselves – and for Sein und Zeit 
Dasein specifically. However, as Heidegger indicates through the notion of appearing 
[Erscheinung], what remains hidden, what announces itself through the phenomena of beings is 
being itself. Thus, as Dasein is to be interrogated, it is clearly delimited that through an 
investigation into the appearance of Dasein as a phenomenon through its average everyday 
being-in-the-world, the very mode of appearing itself, Dasein’s being, can be accessed.45 
 Following this presentation on the meaning of ϕαινόμενον, Heidegger then moves to a 
discussion of the meaning of λόγοσ. Here, the critical element of λόγοσ in its ‘letting something 
be seen’ thus provides an account of the revelatory character of discourse. Heidegger begins by 
expressing the essential meaning of λόγοσ as discourse [Rede] and further investigating its 
nature. He thus writes:  
…λόγοσ as discourse really means δελοῦν, to make manifest ‘what is being talked about’ 
in discourse. Aristotle explicates this function of discourse more precisely as 
ἀποϕαίνεσθαι. λόγοσ lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely what is being talked 
about, and indeed for the speaker…Discourse ‘lets us see,’ άπό…from itself, what is 
being talks about. In discourse (άποφανσις), insofar as it is genuine, what is said should 
be derived from what is being talked about.46 
 
44 GA 2: 31/29. 
 
45 These remarks are further clarified as Heidegger writes GA 2: 29/28: “Appearing is an announcing of itself 
through something that shows itself.” For further discussion, see François Raffoul, Thinking of the Event, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming). 
 
46 GA 2: 32/30-31. For further discussion on ύνθηεσις [synthesis] see GA 2: 33/31. 
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It is from this essential revelatory character of άποφανσις in discourse that Heidegger extracts the 
relation between truth and λόγοσ.47 Thus, as it is termed by Heidegger, this ‘apophantic speech’ 
serves an essential determination for the understanding of λόγοσ with respect to phenomenology. 
As he writes:  
Furthermore, because λόγοσ lets something be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But 
everything depends on staying clear of any concept of truth construed in the sense of 
‘correspondence’ or ‘accordance’ [Ubereinstimmung]. This idea is by no means the 
primary one in the concept of άλήθεια. The ‘being-true’ of λόγοσ as άληθεύειν means: to 
take beings that are being talked about in λέγειν as άποφαίνεσθαι out of their 
concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed (άλεθές); to discover them.48 
 Having addressed ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ individually, Heidegger now investigates their 
unified meaning to present a guiding understanding of phenomenology as a method. In this 
manner, Heidegger thus begins: “The expression ‘phenomenology’ can be formulated in Greek 
as λέγειν τά φαινόμενα. But λέγειν means ἀποϕαίνεσθαι. Hence phenomenology means: 
ἀποϕαίνεσθαι τά φαινόμενα – to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself 
from itself.”49 However, given this highly formal definition, Heidegger remarks: “But this 
expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: ‘To the things themselves!’”50 Thus, 
to make matters clear, Heidegger directly addresses phenomenology, and indeed as the method 
of ontology. In this manner, from the previous analyses of ϕαινόμενον and λόγοσ, the specific 
operation of unconcealment or disclosure [άλήθεια] is expressed as the proper aim of 
phenomenology. He thus writes: “Accordingly, the term ‘phenomenology’ differs in meaning 
 
47 For further discussion, see GA 2: 33/31-32. Here, as Heidegger warns: “But because ‘truth’ has this meaning, and 
because λόγοσ is a specific mode of letting something be seen, λόγοσ simply may not be appealed to as the primary 
‘place’ of truth.”  
 
48 GA 2: 33/31. See GA 2: 33/31 for further discussion on concealment and being-false.  
 
49 GA 2: 34/32. 
 
50 Ibid. 
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from such expressions as ‘theology’ and the like…‘Phenomenology’ neither designates the 
object of its research nor is it a title that describes their content. The word only tells us something 
about the how of the demonstration and the treatment of what this discipline considers.”51  
Heidegger thus brings these matters to bear on the essential aim of Sein und Zeit, as 
phenomenology takes its charge from beings themselves, with the task of explicating their being 
as the method of ontology. As Heidegger writes: “What is it that phenomenology is to ‘let be 
seen?’…Manifestly it is something that does not show itself initially and for the most part, 
something that is concealed [verborgen].”52 He continues: “But what remains concealed in an 
exceptional sense…is not this or that being but rather, as we have shown in our foregoing 
observations, the being of beings.”53 It is from these matter that Heidegger emphatically imparts: 
“Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative matter of determination of, that 
which is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. The 
phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings.”54 
 Thus, in this manner, the phenomenological method reaches its prime determination by 
Heidegger as the method of ontology, that which seeks to disclose beings in their being as they 
show themselves. From these considerations, Heidegger thus reaches an essential delimitation of 
the task of Sein und Zeit to follow – the phenomenological investigation and interpretation of the 
being of Dasein from which the meaning of being in general may be accessed in some 
provisional manner. Thus, the primary task to follow these methodological considerations is the 
 
51 GA 2: 34-35/32-33. For a brief address of phenomenological description, see GA 2: 35/33. 
 
52 GA 2: 35/33.  
 
53 Ibid. 
 
54 GA 2: 35/33. For further discussion on concealment and being covered up, see GA 2: 36/34. 
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examination of Dasein in its average everyday mode of being-in-the-world. For as Heidegger 
writes: “Because phenomenon in the phenomenological understanding is just what constitutes 
being, and furthermore because being is always the being of beings, we must first of all bring 
beings themselves forward in the right way if we are to have any prospect of exposing being.”55   
Further in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger expresses this phenomenological disclosure as the 
‘letting-be’ [sein lassen] and ‘clearing’ [lichtung] of Dasein itself.56 In this manner, as 
phenomena are revealed and thus ‘brought to light’, they are ontologically interpreted in some 
fashion. As there being is disclosed through some determinate approach, they are thus ‘let be’ 
depending on the manner of access, generating the fiat lux that exposes the being of beings 
through Dasein. Heidegger here delimits this path from phenomenology to ontology, once more 
by explicating the phenomenality of the German word Gang [way] to express the path of access 
to being through beings: “The way of encountering being and the structures of being in the mode 
of phenomenon must first be wrested [abgewonnen] from the objects of phenomenology. Thus 
the point of departure [Ausgang] of the analysis, the access [Zugang] to the phenomenon, and 
the passage through [Durchgang] the prevalent coverings must secure their own method.”57 
From these considerations from Sein und Zeit, the development of phenomenology as the method 
of ontology has thus been expressed through the essential structure of the Daseinanalytik, 
Heidegger’s venture into the being of Dasein and towards being in general. These matters serve 
to determine, as Heidegger imparts: “Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking 
 
55 GA 2: 37/35. 
 
56 See GA 2: 84-85/82-83 and GA 2: 133/129-130 for further discussion on letting-be [sein lassen] and clearing 
[Lichtung], respectively. It is from this initial understanding of letting-be as sein lassen expressed in GA 2 that 
Heidegger will determine this concept as Gelassenheit. 
 
57 GA 2: 36-37/34, (my brackets). See GA 2: 37/34 for further discussion on phenomenology as the method of 
ontology, including a brief discussion of hermeneutics.   
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its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analysis of existence [Existenz], has 
fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and 
to which it returns.”58 
Reduction, Construction, Destruction 
 In the Summer semester of 1927, immediately following the publication of Sein und Zeit, 
Heidegger continues with the essential problematics of the Seinsverständnis of Dasein and the 
explication of the meaning of being in general in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 
24). Indeed, as a somewhat ‘sequel’ to the incomplete Sein und Zeit,59 GA 24 expounds on 
Heidegger’s indication to repeat the entire Daseinanalytik along the exposition of the horizon of 
time as the guiding phenomena through which being can appear.60 In this manner, GA 24 
contains Heidegger’s address of four traditional ontological theses concerning the nature of being 
for the sake of explicating four corresponding ‘basic problems of phenomenology’ through 
phenomenological interpretation. However, far from an ‘original science of factical life,’ the 
insistence on GA 24 as comprised of the basic problems of phenomenology properly understood 
makes it very clear that above all others, being itself is the basic problem of phenomenology and 
the phenomena of temporality [Temporalität] as the horizon of possibility for being itself. In this 
manner, ontology and phenomenology continue to be at one as phenomenology serves as the 
method to an access and thinking of being itself.  
 
58 GA 2: 38/36. 
 
59 As translator Albert Hofstadter remarks throughout GA 24: xv-xvi, this text serves as the missing Division III of 
Sein und Zeit as Heidegger seeks to repeat the Daseinanalytik with the proper thematization of temporality 
[Temporalität] as the horizon for being’s appearance. For further discussion, see Lee Braver, Division III of Being 
and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being.  
 
60 See GA 2: 331-333/316-318. 
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Indeed, just as Heidegger begins in the 1919/20 lecture course, it remains so here in 1927 
as he first addresses phenomenology and its position with respect to the lecture as a whole. He 
states: “This course sets for itself the task of posing the basic problems of phenomenology, 
elaborating them, and proceeding to some extent toward their solution. Phenomenology must 
develop its concept out of what it takes as its theme and how it investigates its object.”61 In this 
manner, what is to be discussed is thus not phenomenology as such, but rather the basic problems 
that phenomenology attends to. As Heidegger insists: “The point is not to gain some knowledge 
about philosophy, but to be able to philosophize.”62 In this manner, phenomenology is 
furthermore not to be understood “as just one philosophical science among others, nor is it the 
science preparatory to the rest of them [logic, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion]; 
rather, the expression ‘phenomenology’ is the name for the method of scientific philosophy in 
general.”63 This understanding of scientific philosophy serves to distinguish phenomenology 
from the convictions of world-view philosophy as the “wisdom of the world and of life…to 
provide a Weltanschauung, a world-view.”64 In this manner, phenomenology thus takes its place 
in scientific philosophy as the sole method of ontology – philosophy’s essential realm. As 
Heidegger states: “being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy…philosophy is not a science 
of beings but of being…ontology.”65  
 
61 GA 24: 1/1. 
 
62 GA 24: 2/1-2.  
 
63 GA 24: 3/3. 
 
64 GA 24: 5/4, (my italics). 
 
65 GA 24: 15/11. 
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 Following these introductory remarks, Heidegger proceeds to the first division of GA 24 
with phenomenological investigations of each thesis in order to explicate the genuine ontological 
problems within that will serve as phenomenology’s basic problems. Heidegger thus presents the 
four traditional theses as follows: “1. Kant’s thesis: Being is not a real predicate. 2. The thesis of 
medieval ontology…essence (Was-sein, essential) [and] existence or extantness (existential, 
Vorhandensein). 3. The thesis of modern ontology…the being of nature (res existensa) and the 
being of the mind (res cogitans). 4. The thesis of logic…the ‘is.’ The being of the copula.”66 To 
address these matters for the sake of reaching an understanding of the “fundamental question of 
the whole science of being…the question of the meaning of being in general…”67 the analysis of 
these theses will take its charge from the Seinsverständnis already present in the temporality 
[Zeitlichkeit] Dasein that in itself reveals temporality [Temporalität] as the horizon for the 
interpretation of being itself. 68 With this in mind, Heidegger makes an advanced indication of 
the essential ontological problematics within each thesis that will be explicated as the four basic 
problems of phenomenology. The list is as follows: “1. The problem of the ontological difference 
(the distinction between being and beings). 2. The problem of the basic articulation of being 
(essential, existential). 3. The problem of the possible modifications of being and the unity of its 
 
66 GA 24: 20/15, (my italics).  
 
67 GA 24: 21/16. 
 
68 Note, Heidegger provides a distinction in both GA 2 and GA 24 between temporality as Zeitlichkeit and 
Temporalität, the first referring to the ontological structure of Dasein and the last to being itself. As expressed in GA 
24: 22/16: “If temporality [Zeitlichkeit] constitutes the meaning of the being of the human Dasein [den Seinssinn des 
menschlichen Dasein] and if the understanding of being [Seinsverständnis] belongs to the constitution 
[Seinsverfassung] of the Dasein’s being, then this understanding of being, too, must be possible only on the basis of 
temporality [Zeitlichkeit].” Compared to GA 24: 22/17: “The fundamental subject of research in ontology, as 
determination of the meaning of being by way of time, is Temporality [Temporalität].” See Francoise Dastur, 
Heidegger and the Concept of Time for further discussion.  
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manifoldness [as the how and what of modes of the being of beings]. 4. The truth-character of 
being [as the disclosedness of truth in the ‘it is’].”69  
 Following these matters, Heidegger then gives explicit considerations on the method to 
be employed in the investigation and explication of these theses towards their basic ontological 
problematics. Here, Heidegger begins by remarking that ontology, as the study of the being of 
beings towards being itself, finds itself through the Seinsverständnis of Dasein. As Heidegger 
writes: “Being is given only if the understanding of being, hence the Dasein, exists.”70 To grasp 
being thusly, however, Heidegger explains once again that it is through phenomenology as the 
method of ontology that the understanding of being in the analysis of Dasein is accessed and 
worked-upon. To explain this route further, Heidegger thus presents a reformulation of the 
phenomenological method as it aims to reach being itself through an encounter with beings. This 
three-fold phenomenological method serves to situate phenomenology as the direct path to 
ontology.  
As Heidegger begins: “Being is to be laid hold of and made our theme. Being is always 
being of beings and accordingly it becomes accessible at first only by starting with some being. 
Here the phenomenological vision which does the apprehending must indeed direct itself toward 
a being….”71 In this manner, the being of a being must be accessed and investigated in a proper 
regard in order for being to become thematized as the being of this being, namely, Dasein – in 
this way the phenomenological method of ontology receives its characterization. As Heidegger 
explains, “Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns…to some being; but 
 
69 GA 24: 33/24, (my brackets, as inclusions on definitions from GA 24: 23-25/18-19).   
 
70 GA 24: 26/19. 
 
71 GA 24: 28/21. 
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then, in a precise way, it is led away from that being and led back to its being. We call this basic 
component of phenomenological method – the leading back…[from a] being to being – 
phenomenological reduction.”72 From this first step in the phenomenological method, an 
essential position is reached whereby being itself is rendered accessible as the being of beings in 
some provisional manner.   
However, as Heidegger states: “Phenomenological reduction as the leading of our vision 
from beings to being nevertheless is not the only basic component of phenomenological method; 
in fact, it is not even the central component.”73 In this manner, it is thematically necessary that 
being itself must be approached in its own right as it itself is the sole aim of phenomenological 
ontology. Thus, to reach the second step in the phenomenological method, Heidegger states the 
following: “Being does not become accessible like a being. We do not simply find it in front of 
us. As is to be shown, it must always be brought to view in a free projection. This projecting of 
the antecedently given being upon its being and the structures of its being we call 
phenomenological construction.”74 At this stage, being itself is grasped in some provisional way, 
and such constructions are indeed related to hermeneutical interpretations. However, neither is 
this second stage consummate of phenomenological ontology. As Heidegger writes:  
But the method of phenomenology is likewise not exhausted by phenomenological 
construction. We have heard that every projection of being occurs in a reductive 
recursion from beings…This commencement is obviously always determined by the 
factual experience of beings and the range of possibilities of experience that at any time 
 
72 GA 24: 28-29/21, (My brackets). Here, Heidegger directly remarks on this reference to Husserl. See GA 24: 29/21 
for more discussion.  
 
73 GA 24: 29/21. 
 
74 GA 24: 29-30/21-22. 
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are peculiar to factical Dasein, and hence to the historical situation of a philosophical 
investigation.75  
Indeed, as the concept of history and its affects has been of essential importance to 
phenomenology, Heidegger provides further explanation, stating: “The store of basic 
philosophical concepts derived from the philosophical tradition is still so influential today that 
this effect of tradition can be hardly overestimated. It is for this reason that all philosophical 
discussion, even the most radical attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional 
concepts and thus by traditional horizons….”76 Thus, to provide a proper formulation of a 
phenomenological construction of being, the third stage of the phenomenological method must 
be invoked. As Heidegger states:  
It is for this reason that there necessarily belongs to the conceptual interpretation of being 
and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of being, a destruction – a critical 
process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must be necessarily employed, 
are de-constructed down to the sources from which they are drawn. Only by means of this 
destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine 
character of its concepts.77 
 Having presented this three-fold determination of the phenomenological method of 
ontology, Heidegger thus delimits the process whereby a phenomenological interpretation of the 
four ontological theses may be rendered as four basic problems of phenomenology. It is thus 
through reduction, construction, and destruction that being itself, the sole theme of philosophy as 
phenomenological ontology, may be accessed and the possibility of ontological knowledge may 
be attained through Dasein’s essential Seinsverständnis.78 As Heidegger states in closing on 
 
75 GA 24: 30/22. 
 
76 GA 24: 31/22. 
 
77 GA 24: 31/22-23.  
 
78 For further discussion on reduction, construction, and destruction, see François Raffoul, Thinking of the Event, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming). 
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these methodological remarks: “The method of ontology thus delineated makes it possible to 
characterize the idea of phenomenology distinctively as the scientific procedure of philosophy. 
We therewith gain the possibility of defining the concept of philosophy more concretely. Thus 
our considerations [on the scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology] lead 
back again to the starting point of the course.”79  
Interpretations of Kant  
   In the 1927/28 Winter semester lecture Phenomenologische Interpretationen von Kants 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (GA 25) directly follows the critical ontological problematic of the 
Seinsverständnis expressed in GA 24 through a reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Here, 
through phenomenological interpretation, Heidegger explicates the essential problematic of the 
possibility of ontological knowledge in Kant’s work, expressed through the possibility of 
synthetic judgement and a priori intuition essential for a grounding of pure reason and thus 
philosophy itself. In this manner, through such pursuit of the possibility of the Seinsverständnis 
in phenomenological interpretations of Kant, Heidegger discovers a new essential ontological 
problematic – the possibility of the ‘knowing comportment’ as the transcendence of Dasein. In 
this manner GA 25 serves as an essential stage of development for phenomenology as the 
method of ontology. Here, what is first readily apparent is the operation of phenomenological 
interpretation. As it has been employed many times by Heidegger before, what is decisive in this 
operation is the interpretation of a text as the expression of a particular ground of experience 
through which phenomenology can investigate to grasp essential concepts and basic problems.80 
 
79 GA 24: 32/23, (my brackets).  
 
80 See Chapter 1: “Destruction and Formal Indication” and “Hermeneutics” for further discussion on 
phenomenological interpretation in GA 60 and 61.  
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Thus, as Heidegger expresses at the outset of GA 25, the task of the lecture will be indeed “to 
understand Kant properly [which] means to understand him better than he understood himself.”81  
In this manner, it is from a close reading of the Critique that the essential problematic of 
Kant’s thinking is to be extracted, as Heidegger relates it to be the possibility of ontological 
knowledge through the problem of a priori intuition. Thus, what is at stake for phenomenological 
interpretation is as Heidegger states: “of bringing the observations made so far to focus on the 
fundamental problems….”82 Indeed, this task of phenomenological interpretation is thus of 
critical ontological importance, for through the interpretations of Kant, the Seinsverständnis and 
transcendence of Dasein become understood as expressed in the Critique. Thus, through 
investigation and interpretation of synthetic judgement, the a priori, intuition and thinking, and 
appearance,83 Heidegger reaches an essential determination of Kant’s “radical grounding of the 
possibility of ontological knowledge”84 essential for the growing task of a pure Seinsverständnis.  
 As Heidegger states at the beginning of GA 25, the guiding understanding of the 
phenomenological interpretation of Kant takes as it first theme an understanding of metaphysics 
and of metaphysics as philosophy. Thus, he begins by addressing the word itself: “Literally the 
word metaphysics -– means that which comes after that which deals with φύσις or nature, the 
world in general, and being.”85 Indeed, as Heidegger continues, such meaning originates from its 
 
81 GA 25: 3/2. 
 
82 GA 25: 387/262. 
 
83 This is not an exhaustive list of the concepts addressed in the interpretation of the Critique. 
 
84 GA 25: 431/292. 
 
85 GA 25: 11/8. 
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place in the works of Aristotle, referring to the treatises following the Physics. Thus, 
metaphysics receives further signification from the content of these treatises, as Heidegger states:  
People saw that these treatises dealt with the problem of the world as a whole and in a 
comprehensive sense…an inquiry which Aristotle designates as theology. On the other 
hand, there were essays which took as object of inquiry the totality of beings as such 
insofar as they are beings; and this discipline, which inquires into beings as beings and 
questions the meaning of the being of beings, was called πρότη φιλοσοφία, i.e., first 
philosophy.86 
Here, as Heidegger makes explicit, from the outset of the course, metaphysics and philosophy, as 
ontology, are at one. Thus, as Heidegger explains, this is the essential meaning of general 
metaphysics: “We already heard that in the collection of Aristotelian treatises called ‘μετά τά 
φυσικά’ there were essays which dealt with beings as beings, with ὄν ἡ ὄν or ens inquantum 
ens…The metaphysical discipline which deals with being in general…is called general 
metaphysics or metaphysica generalis.”87  
Heidegger then relates this essential meaning of metaphysics to its position in Kant’s 
thinking, where what is at stake is indeed ‘transcendence.’ As he explains from its meaning in 
Aristotle: “The essays ‘transcend’ unto something which lies beyond ‘physics;’ and the meaning 
of the μετά in the technical title of ‘metaphysics’ gets transformed. It no longer means post – 
following sequentially – but means trans: transcending what is considered in ‘physics’ and its 
manner of treating the problematic. Metaphysics is thus the science of the super-sensible.”88 
However, as Heidegger endeavors through the essential project of the course to better formulate 
metaphysics it guides an understanding of ontological knowledge, it is thus this understanding of 
Metaphysics by Kant that must be held suspect. As Heidegger explains: “Kant does not deny the 
 
86 GA 25: 11/9. 
 
87 GA 25: 12/10. This is to be distinguished from ‘special metaphysics’ as discussed further here.  
 
88 GA 25: 12/9. For further discussion, see GA 25: 14-17/10-12. 
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possibility of metaphysics, but holds on to traditional metaphysics in its ultimate goal as genuine 
metaphysics. The only question is: Whither and how are we to attempt this crossing over to the 
super-sensible?”89  
Indeed, for Heidegger, this is the essential question of the possibility of ontological 
knowledge itself. In this manner, to retrieve a genuine understanding of metaphysics and thus of 
ontology, the second critical element at-stake for the project of GA 25 arises. Thus, as Heidegger 
proceeds to delimit the path to understanding Kant’s Critique and thereby philosophy, as 
metaphysics, through phenomenological interpretations of knowledge as the being of science, the 
essential comportment of Dasein towards entities becomes a thematic endeavor as it reveals the 
transcendence of Dasein. Thus, as Heidegger writes:  
We begin our observation with a preliminary designation of science as a kind of 
knowing. But we do not mean knowing in the sense of the known, but rather as knowing 
comportment. This comportment is not a so-called psychic process in the interior of a so-
called soul. Rather, as human comportment it is a definite, possible way for humans to 
be. To inhere in this way of being and of knowing means to have a relationship with 
beings that are knowable or known…This way of being relates to beings themselves; in 
fact, it is a comportment which reveals the being to which it is related.90  
To bring these matters to bear with their essential significance in the Daseinanalytik, and indeed 
for the future reference to Kant’s Critique, Heidegger thus expresses this knowing comportment 
in the following way:  
The revealing comportment toward beings which occasionally surrounds human Dasein 
is a free possibility of this Dasein. Generally we give the name existence [Existenz] to the 
way of being which is peculiar to human Dasein and to which moreover knowing belongs 
as a free possibility. Humans exist, whereas things in nature are extant [vorhanden]. 
 
89 GA 25: 16-17/12. 
 
90 GA 25: 18/13. 
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Accordingly we conceive knowing as a free possibility of human existence 
[menschlichen Existenz].91  
 Before proceeding towards these essential problematics explicated through 
phenomenological interpretations of Kant, Heidegger first presents a few methodological 
remarks. Here, Heidegger directly indicates the essential character of the Critique, and indeed as 
one of phenomenological standing. He states: “It is important ‘to see what reason produces 
entirely out of itself,’92 which cannot conceal itself but will be brought to light by reason 
itself…If pure reason is to become an object to itself, i.e., to attain self-knowledge, then the 
manner of investigation itself is pure a priori knowledge.”93 Thus, Heidegger illuminates the 
critical phenomenological nature of Kant’s operation in the Critique as an essential task of self-
knowing. As he states: “In its basic posture the method of the Critique is what we, since Husserl, 
understand, carry out, and learn to ground more radically as phenomenological method. That is 
why a phenomenological interpretation of the Critique is the only interpretation that fits Kant’s 
own intentions, even as these intentions are not clearly spelled out by him.”94 Following these 
considerations, Heidegger further remarks on the nature of the phenomenological interpretation 
to follow. Here, as Kant’s task in the Critique is the grounding of pure reason, and indeed of 
philosophy itself understood as metaphysics, Heidegger states: “The main task of our 
phenomenological interpretation consists in rendering this foundation visible and in determining 
it positively.”95 This, in contrast with the many misunderstandings and misinterpretations of 
 
91 Ibid., (my brackets). For further discussion on being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein] and freedom [Freiheit] see 
GA 25: 19-25/13-18. 
 
92 Kant, Kritik A, xx., (Heidegger’s citation).  
 
93 GA 25: 72/50. 
 
94 GA 25: 71/49. 
 
95 GA 25: 79/54. 
 
 
78 
 
Kant’s transcendental aesthetic and logic, this task must be the sole guidance of a genuine 
understanding of the Critique itself and indeed if it is to serve as the further ground to explicate 
the Seinsverständnis.96  
Further on in the lecture, Heidegger presents a precise indication on these essential 
misunderstanding of Kant, namely that such a radical attempt to ground philosophy via pure 
reason has been taken by the philosophical tradition as the positing of a worldview 
[Weltanschauung] rather than an attempt to ground philosophy itself in pure reason. As 
Heidegger writes: “Nowadays one is easily inclined to attribute to Kant’s Weltanschauung…this 
predominant superiority of the mind over the body. Such a Weltanschauung exists in every 
scientific philosophy – in Plato and Aristotle as well as Hegel - and it would be a wretched dunce 
of a philosopher who would not share such a Weltanschauung.”97 He continues:  
However, we are not concerned with a Weltanschauung but with a fundamental 
methodological question which decides the possibility of philosophy in general, namely 
whether it is possible to ground philosophy as such by laying out the foundation of the 
problematic in sensibility. Philosophy is the conceptual knowledge of a fundamental 
realm of phenomena – indeed a conceptual knowledge which must necessarily be 
grounded in and guided by a self-knowledge of human Dasein.98 
In this manner, as Heidegger writes, “The problem which Kant poses will be brought to light 
only by coming philosophically to terms with him…according to his own challenge.”99 Thus, in 
this way, it is through phenomenological interpretation that a genuine understanding of Kant’s 
 
96 For further discussion on these misunderstandings see GA 25: 75-80/50-55. 
 
97 GA 25: 397/269. 
 
98 Ibid. 
 
99 GA 25: 74/51. 
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aims in the Critique will be achieved, further still as Heidegger states: “We are for Kant against 
Kantianism.”100 Indeed, as Heidegger imparts in the end of GA 25: 
When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, 
against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant 
became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my 
research…In Kant as in no other thinker one has the immediate certainty that he does not 
cheat. And the most monstrous danger in philosophy consists in cheating…But where the 
greatest danger of cheating is, there is also the ultimate possibility for the genuineness of 
thinking and questioning. The meaning of doing philosophy consists in awakening the 
need for this genuiness and in keeping it awake.101 
Metaphysics 
 Following this, in the Spring of 1929 Heidegger delivered Was ist Metaphysik? (GA 9) as 
an inaugural address for his instatement as professor at Freiburg University upon Husserl’s 
retirement. Here, the aim of the lecture address concerns a deeper understanding of metaphysics, 
following the interpretations of Kant, one that through phenomenology presents the essential 
concept for the possibility of all ontology – the nothing [das Nichts].102 Here, phenomenology 
appears as the direct method of metaphysics, ontology, in what Heidegger calls the unfolding 
[Entfaltung] of the nothing. In this manner, Heidegger presents what is to be understood as a 
phenomenological description and thus an ontological determination as he addresses the 
nihilating character of the nothing. Thus, through metaphysics understood as μετά τά φυσιχά, the 
transcendent study ‘beyond beings’ and thus to being itself, ontology is grasped in its pure 
possibility through the presentation of the nothing. Heidegger thus further approaches the idea of 
metaphysics as a pure ontology, invoking phenomenology as its essential methodological 
 
100 GA 25: 279/190. 
 
101 GA 25: 431/292-93. 
 
102 There is a relation here between the nothing [das Nichts] and death [der Tod] as expressed in Sein und Zeit (GA 
2: 267-301/257-288). The origin of this concept appears in Heidegger’s thought as early as 1922 through the 
ruinance [Ruinanz] of Dasein. See GA 61: 131-155/98-115 for further discussion.   
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disclosure. These matters serve to situate Heidegger’s thinking towards the pure thinking of 
being through metaphysics which must be recovered through an address of the history of the 
thinking of being. Thus, following the final presentation of the development of phenomenology 
in this chapter, the way will be prepared in a proper manner for the next stage in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological thinking of the history of being through metaphysics.  
 Heidegger begins GA 9 by introducing the essential task of the lecture, an understanding 
of metaphysics: “‘What is metaphysics?’…This question we will forego. Instead we will take up 
a particular metaphysical question. In this way it seems we will let ourselves be transposed 
directly into metaphysics. Only in this way will we provide metaphysics the proper occasion to 
introduce itself.”103 Thus, to guide the lecture towards a self-imposed understanding of 
metaphysics, Heidegger provides a traditional metaphysical question, “Why are there beings at 
all, and why not far rather Nothing?”104 It will thus be this metaphysical thinking of the nothing 
that will serve to ground an understanding of metaphysics, and indeed as the very possibility of 
the being of beings itself. Here, Heidegger’s tact in handling philosophical matters has indeed 
reached a critical stage in his phenomenological thinking. As expressed previously through 
disclosure and the proper approach to beings, what is here decisive is letting metaphysics ‘show-
itself,’ indeed, to manifest phenomenologically in its own way.  
Proceeding in this manner, Heidegger thus presents several key remarks that will guide 
the self-introduction of metaphysics. He begins by providing the following critical 
determinations which highlight the priority of the nothing in all scientific research: “That to 
which the relation to the world refers are beings themselves – and nothing besides. That from 
 
103 GA 9: 103/82. 
 
104 GA 9: 122/96. 
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which every stance takes its guidance are beings themselves – and nothing further. That with 
which the scientific confrontation in the irruption occurs are beings themselves – and beyond 
that, nothing.”105 These considerations serve Heidegger’s task of a proper formulation of the 
question itself so that the nothing can appear by its own right and thus provide its own 
understanding of metaphysics.106 Heidegger then considers a provisional understanding of the 
nothing as the ‘not’ [nicht] of logical negation. From these considerations, Heidegger then brings 
this ‘common nothing’ into a more precise understanding, as he explicates it essential ontological 
foundation. It is from these considerations that Heidegger ultimately states: “The nothing is the 
complete negation of the totality of beings.”107 In this manner, Heidegger thus draws a relation 
between the nothing and beings that is essential to its self-unfolding.  
 As the nothing is here understood as the negation of beings, Heidegger delves further into 
the position of Dasein with respect to beings as whole. Here he states: “The totality of beings 
must be given in advance so as to be able to fall prey straightaway to negation – in which the 
nothing itself would then be manifest.”108 In response to this, Heidegger states: “As surely as we 
can never comprehend absolutely the whole of beings in themselves we certainly do find 
ourselves stationed in the midst of beings that are unveiled somehow as a whole.”109 In this 
manner, Heidegger then seeks to locate a sense of the nothing in Dasein’s attunement 
[Befindlichkeit] from this essential relatedness to beings.110 Here, he states: “Does such an 
 
105 GA 9: 105/84. 
 
106 See GA 9: 104-108/82-86 for further discussion on the position of the nothing in scientific research.  
 
107 GA 9: 109/86. 
 
108 Ibid. 
 
109 GA 9: 110/87. 
 
110 See GA 2: 134-142/130-138 for further discussion on attunement [Befindlichkeit].  
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attunement, in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur in human existence? It can 
and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a moment in the fundamental mood of 
anxiety.”111 Pursuing this matter further, Heidegger then presents Dasein’s encounter with the 
nothing as it is found in anxiety [die Angst]. Here, the meaning of anxiety is first distinguished 
from “the quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness….”112 Rather it is 
through anxiety as a fundamental uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit] in Dasein that the nothing is 
encountered. As Heidegger states:  
In anxiety we say, ‘one feels uncanny.’ What is ‘it’ that makes ‘one’ feel uncanny?...All 
things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere 
disappearance. Rather, in their very receding, things turn towards us. The receding of 
beings as a whole, closing in on us in anxiety, oppresses us. We can get no hold on 
things. In the slipping away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and 
remains.113 
Thus, from this Heidegger ultimately states: “Anxiety makes manifest the nothing.”114 To 
explain this further, he states: “This implies that we ourselves – we humans who are in being – in 
the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At bottom therefore it is not as though ‘you’ or ‘I’ 
feel uncanny; rather it is this way for some ‘one.’ In the altogether unsettling experience of this 
hovering where there is nothing to hold on to, pure Da-sein is all that is still there.”115 From these 
determinations which source anxiety as the site of appearance of the nothing, Heidegger then 
states that it is necessary to interrogate Dasein’s attunement to the nothing in anxiety from which 
an understanding of the nothing can appear. Here, as Heidegger begins: “In anxiety beings as a 
 
111 GA 9: 111/88.   
 
112 Ibid. See GA 2: 140-142/136-138 and 184-191/178-184 for Heidegger’s distinction between fear [die Furcht] and 
anxiety [die Angst], respectively.  
 
113 GA 9: 11-112/88. 
 
114 GA 9: 112/88. 
 
115 GA 9: 112/88-89. 
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whole become superfluous.”116 To pursue this matter further, Heidegger then provides an 
analysis of the essential nihilating character of the nothing through annihilation and repulsion. 
Here, he states:  
In anxiety there occurs a shrinking back before…that is surely not any sort of flight but 
rather a kind of entranced calm. This ‘back before’ takes its departure from the nothing. 
The nothing itself does not attract; it is essentially repelling. But this repulsion is itself as 
such a parting gesture toward beings that are submerged as a whole. This wholly 
repelling gesture…which is the action of the nothing that closes in on Dasein in anxiety, 
is the essence of the nothing: nihilation.117  
Indeed, it is from this point that Heidegger emphatically states: “The nothing itself nihilates.”118 
From this essential exposition of the character of the nothing, Heidegger then provides a 
response to this essential metaphysical question that concerns the possibility of the being of 
beings at all. Here, he states:  
The nothing is neither an object nor any being at all. The nothing comes forward neither 
for itself nor next to beings, which it would, as it were, adhere. For human Dasein, the 
nothing makes possible the manifestness of beings as such. The nothing does not merely 
serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential 
unfolding as such. In the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs.119 
Thus, Heidegger returns to the essential task of the lecture itself, an understanding of 
metaphysics. He thus states: “Our inquiry concerning the nothing is to bring us face to face with 
metaphysics itself. The name ‘metaphysics’ derives from the Greek μετά τά φυσιχά. This 
peculiar title was later interpreted as characterizing the question that extends μετά or trans – 
‘over’ – beings as such.”120 As explicated from the self-unfolding of the nothing, the meaning of 
 
116 GA 9: 113/90. 
 
117 GA 9: 114/90. 
 
118 Ibid. 
 
119 GA 9: 115/91. 
 
120 GA 9: 118/93. 
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metaphysics thus becomes apparent as Heidegger states: “Metaphysics is inquiry beyond or over 
beings that aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our grasp. In the question concerning 
the nothing such an inquiry beyond or over beings, beings as a whole, takes place. It proves 
thereby to be a ‘metaphysical’ question.”121  
In this manner, the phenomenon of the nothing thus proves to be the possibility for the 
manifestation of beings and for metaphysics, as ontology, as a whole. Indeed, as Heidegger 
explains: “Only if science exists on the basis of metaphysics can it ever fulfill in ever-renewed 
ways its essential task…Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the 
total strangeness of beings overwhelm us.”122 It is thus in this manner that the essential 
metaphysical question ‘Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?’ manifests 
metaphysics as a philosophical endeavor. As Heidegger states: “The question of the nothing puts 
us, the questioners, ourselves in question. It is a metaphysical question.”123 As Heidegger 
explains: “As long as human beings exist, philosophizing of some sort occurs. Philosophy – what 
we call philosophy – is the getting under way of metaphysics, in which it comes to itself and to 
its explicit tasks. Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence 
into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole.”124  
 From these consideration on metaphysics, Heidegger thus reaches a critical development 
of phenomenology as the method of ontology through the self-unfolding of the nothing. In this 
manner, as phenomenology overall serves as a way of doing philosophy, Heidegger thus 
 
121 GA 9: 118-119/93-94. 
 
122 GA 9: 121/95. 
 
123 GA 9: 121/96. 
 
124 GA 9: 122/96. 
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indicates its essential character as the path to the self-manifestation of the phenomenon of the 
nothing, and as that which brings forward being as such, allows philosophy to address being in 
its pure possibility. From this chapter, it has been made clear how phenomenology provides a 
method of ontology, a way of access to being itself, first through the interrogation of the being of 
Dasein and the access of its Seinsverständnis, which in turn leads towards phenomenological 
disclosure of the being of beings. It is through this thinking of Dasein that phenomenology 
further serves as the way to a study of being in the possibility of pure ontological knowledge and 
the pure possibility of being itself through the transcendence of Dasein brought forth through the 
thinking of the nothing and its phenomenological unfolding.  
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Conclusion 
As I have made apparent through the presentation of this research, it is quite clear how 
the phenomenological method is understood, employed, and indeed self-informing of 
Heidegger’s philosophical career from 1919-1929. Expressed through Chapter 1, Heidegger thus 
begins with the hermeneutics of facticity – the thinking of life itself in its immediacy – where the 
phenomenological method is largely characterized by stages of description, destruction, and 
interpretation that provide a critical philosophical insight into life experience to allow the 
structures of life, facticity, and Dasein to reveal themselves. During this time, Heidegger 
continues to rethink how philosophy approaches its content, human existence, and its proper 
mode of access to it through phenomenology, bringing the being of Dasein and being itself closer 
into thematic view.  
It is thus upon reaching 1927, as expressed through Chapter 2, that the progression of 
phenomenology towards its ontological import becomes a paramount task for Heidegger, and 
indeed the method of phenomenology becomes oriented towards this task. In this manner, 
description, reduction, construction, and destruction are each reoriented in their goal, but remain 
interconnected the same in operation, as Heidegger seeks to approach beings in a significant 
encounter whereby their being is made manifest. And, as possibility stands higher than actuality, 
it is for the thinking of being in its pure possibility that Heidegger reaches a greater 
understanding of ontology through metaphysics and the phenomenology of the nothing, where 
phenomenology can begin to allow for the thinking of being itself to manifest. Indeed, as 
Heidegger attributes to the understanding of being within Dasein, this meta-ontology is only at 
all made possible as it emerges from human being itself. 
 
 
87 
 
I have thus been able to characterize the critical stages of the phenomenological method 
for Heidegger in its development throughout this period of 1919-1929. In this manner, though 
the core aspects of description, interpretation, reduction, construction, and destruction are present 
at the very beginning, they each receive specific attention as Heidegger moves through different 
stages of his early career in search of the facticity of life, the being of human being, and being 
itself in its pure possibility. Further, the role of phenomenological destruction and interpretation 
to Heidegger’s approach persists with an amazing consistency, as these are not only aspects of 
the overall method explored through various works, but remain his very approach to thinking in 
general. I have made this altogether apparent, in what sense Heidegger employs the 
phenomenological destruction as he begins many of his projects by addressing and critiquing the 
tradition of philosophy so that phenomenology can start afresh. Indeed, he also approaches each 
philosopher from the history of philosophy as one whose expressions and thoughts lend 
themselves to the original and core problematic of philosophy – human existence as the ground 
of all thinking – rendered visible through the decisive exposition of phenomenological 
interpretation.  
Though my task in this project has been restricted to the first decade of Heidegger’s 
work, it becomes altogether clear from my demonstrations herein that phenomenology, and 
specifically the phenomenological thinking of being itself, continues on to characterize 
Heidegger’s thought into the thirties and indeed until the end of his life. In this manner, 
following 1929, Heidegger immediately progresses from the thinking of being through 
metaphysics to a retrieval of being from its concealment in the tradition of philosophy. Here, 
Heidegger looks to Hölderlin for insights on the history of being and its phenomenality as 
expressed through Ereignis, or the event. He challenges Nietzsche against his own thought over 
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four immense volumes. He revives an ancient understanding of being through interpretations of 
Parmenides. Thus, through phenomenology, Heidegger achieves every possibility for the 
thinking of being, and indeed as possibility. It is thus entirely clear in what sense the task of this 
project may continue to track the development of phenomenology through the history of being 
and the thinking of Ereignis in the eras of Heidegger’s thought following 1929. However, what 
remains here will have to suffice until any more can be written – “The form by which this silence 
may alone be broken is real, strenuous work ‘on the things themselves’ [an den Sachen].”125 
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